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ABSTRACT
Tobey, Elizabeth, M.S. Spring 2022
Resource Conservation
In the Shadow of the Megadrought: Opportunities and Challenges for Addressing Loss
and Damage from Climate Change in Chile and Eastern Montana, USA
Chairperson: Dr. Brian C. Chaffin
As the impacts of anthropogenic climate change mount, climaterelated harms, both economic and non-economic, occur across every
inhabited continent and disproportionately affect the world’s most
vulnerable people. In response, the Loss and Damage agenda of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has emerged to
address those climate-related harms that exceed human capacities for
mitigation and adaptation. Significant questions remain regarding how
losses and damages emerge across the globe and how Loss and Damage
policy will be implemented to address those impacts. This thesis explores
two specific questions: (1) national-level Loss and Damage policy
mechanisms; and (2) perceptions of losses and damages among
agricultural producers in the global north. The first study leverages a
framework-guided analysis of national climate policies from Chile to
assess the presence, absence, and potential of national-level Loss and
Damage policy mechanisms within this country. Although Chile’s current
climate strategies do not mirror the global Loss and Damage policy
agenda, certain elements are clearly present. Results suggest limited
relevance for event attribution at the national level, countering an ongoing
debate on the significance of attribution for addressing losses and damages
from a global perspective. The second study explores losses and damages
in Montana, USA, a context not historically framed as a target of global
Loss and Damage policy. Through a survey of Montana farmers and
ranchers’ experiences with extreme events, evidence of both economic and
non-economic harms is found among respondents, as well as a potential
threshold at which agriculturists may change livelihoods given consistent
recurrence of extreme events. Overall, this work provides insight into the
relevance of the global Loss and Damage agenda and its various elements
across a wide range of societal levels and geopolitical contexts, and can
prove valuable as individuals, communities, and nations around the world
grapple with the impending and accelerating impacts of climate change.
Keywords: Loss and Damage, climate change, climate policy
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1. INTRODUCTION
In its most recent report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
delivered a stark warning: that widespread changes to the earth’s climate system are well
underway, with evidence of increasing climate extremes present across every region of
the globe (IPCC, 2021). The acceleration of anthropogenic climate change detailed in the
IPCC report has been accompanied in recent decades by pressing questions, including
many concerning who is responsible for the worst impacts of climate change on human
populations. Climate change is not exclusively an environmental problem that can be
addressed through scientific or technical means alone. Rather, it is a “conundrum of
politics and justice,” with unequal contributions to the problem, disproportionate impacts
on future generations, marginalized groups and poorer citizens, and asymmetries in
decision-making power to determine appropriate responses (Tanner et al., 2015, p. 23).
Today, greenhouse gas emissions from industrialized nations, which dwarf those from the
developing world, have been causally linked to slow-onset trends such as sea level rise
and increased incidences and severity of acute climate-related disasters (typhoons,
droughts, etc.), with the most vulnerable nations and people globally bearing the brunt of
resulting harms (Tschakert et al., 2017, 2019). This grim reality is central to Loss and
Damage, a developing “third pillar” of international climate policy aimed at addressing
the residual impacts of climate change that occur once mitigation and adaptation
strategies fall short (James et al., 2014). For clarity, “Loss and Damage” in this thesis is
capitalized in reference to the emerging global policy agenda while “loss and damage”
refers to the actual harms resulting from climate change-related events that are beyond
mitigation and adaptation. Although Loss and Damage has recently gained visibility
across policy circles and research communities alike (Boyd et al., 2021), many
knowledge gaps remain regarding its implementation in policy and the actual
manifestations of loss and damage across geographic contexts.
1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF LOSS AND DAMAGE
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has
long recognized mitigation and adaptation as the primary strategies for addressing
anthropogenic climate change. Mitigation is understood as the reduction of greenhouse
1

gas emissions and the increase in carbon sinks via efforts like increasing forest cover
(Armenta, 2022), while adaptation is defined as “human-driven adjustments in
ecological, social or economic systems or policy processes, in response to actual or
expected climate stimuli and their effects or impacts” (Armenta, 2022). Loss and
Damage, on the other hand, represents an emerging third mechanism or set of strategies
for addressing the impacts of climate change once adaptation and mitigation efforts fall
short (James et al., 2014). The roots of Loss and Damage lie in a proposal by the island
nation of Vanuatu, presented during the 1991 negotiations that preceded the formation of
the UNFCCC (Broberg, 2020). The proposal, which included an international insurance
pool for island states threatened by sea level rise, marked the beginning of ongoing
discussions about responsibility and liability for the effects of climate change
(Kreienkamp & Vanhala, 2017). Following these negotiations, 16 years passed before
Loss and Damage appeared in a negotiated UNFCCC decision, the 2007 Bali Action Plan
(Vulturius & Davis, 2016). This momentum carried Loss and Damage to inclusion in the
2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework and the 2012 Doha Gateway decision, spurred by
parties to the convention frustrated with the slow pace of climate talks and the resulting
potential for inaction (Kreienkamp & Vanhala, 2017; Vulturius & Davis, 2016)
Loss and Damage was first established as a dedicated policy mechanism in 2013,
in Warsaw, Poland (COP-19), under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and
Damage (WIM). The WIM is the primary vehicle under the UNFCCC to address loss and
damage in developing countries that are especially vulnerable to the adverse effects of
climate change (UNFCCC, 2020). The mechanism serves to promote implementation of
approaches to address loss and damage by undertaking three primary functions: 1)
enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk management approaches,
2) strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among relevant
stakeholders, and 3) enhancing action and support, including finance, technology and
capacity building (UNFCCC, 2020). Subsequently, the inclusion of Loss and Damage
under Article 8 of the 2015 Paris Agreement (COP-21) formally distinguished it as
separate from mitigation and adaptation (Serdeczny et al., 2016b). The creation of an
independent status for Loss and Damage was contentious. Parties from developed and
developing nations held clearly divided positions during the COP-19 negotiations,
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particularly regarding the centrality of compensation to the mechanism (Broberg, 2020b),
a tension still largely unresolved (if not more acutely defined) as of the recent COP-26 in
Glasgow, Scotland.
1.2 DEFINING LOSS AND DAMAGE
The difficulty in agreeing upon the terms of Loss and Damage as delineated in
policy points to a larger disagreement about the definition of the term itself. If anything is
agreed upon in Loss and Damage research, in fact, it’s that there’s no agreed-upon
definition of loss and damage (Boda et al., 2021). How should the actual harms stemming
from climate-related events be understood? The UNFCCC refers to loss and damage in
the context of the WIM as being “associated with the impacts of climate change,
including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2021).
Consensus exists within the literature, however, that no global agreement has been
reached regarding the meaning of loss and damage; nor has the UN officially adopted a
definition (Vanhala & Hestbaek, 2016, Calliari et al., 2019; Calliari et al., 2020;
Tschakert et al., 2019, as cited in Vanhala et al., 2020). This lack of a clear definition,
compounding the use of unclear language in the establishment of the WIM, has resulted
in considerable leeway for interpretation (Broberg, 2020). Acknowledging that losses and
damages are a function of far more than just the impacts of extreme weather events and
slow onset change (Scown et al., 2022), I define “loss and damage” for the purpose of
this thesis as the impacts of climate change that cannot be (or have not been) avoided
through mitigation or adaptation (Shawoo et al., 2021). The lower case “loss and
damage” is differentiated here from “Loss and Damage,” which I use in reference to the
global policy agenda addressing residual climate harms.
Following from inconsistent definitions of loss and damage across the literature,
perceptions of the concept also vary widely, making it difficult to have practical
conversations about the actions needed to address loss and damage (Boyd et al., 2017).
Frequently, perceptions exist on a spectrum of understanding about how Loss and
Damage relates to existing adaptation and mitigation mechanisms. These range from
considering adaptation and mitigation mechanisms as sufficient for addressing all
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climate-related loss and damage to considering losses resulting from climate change as
unavoidable and of critical importance to address (Boyd et al., 2017). Broberg (2020)
expands upon this idea, suggesting that three approaches commonly appear in the
literature for distinguishing between mitigation, adaptation, and Loss and Damage. First,
the “beyond adaptation” approach suggests that loss and damage = insufficient mitigation
+ inadequate adaptation. Second, the “tolerable risk” approach considers the range of
what is perceived as acceptable when it comes to anticipating threats from climate
change. The subjectivity of the term “tolerable” in this approach, however, renders it
vague and of limited use in distinguishing between adaptation and Loss and Damage,
additionally begging important questions: tolerable for whom, and tolerant of what? A
third approach distinguishes between impacts that are “avoidable, unavoidable, or
unavoided” (Broberg, 2020, p. 218). Importantly, in a review of the state of the Loss and
Damage literature, McNamara & Jackson (2019) note that almost half (45.1%) of the 122
publications reviewed conceptualized loss and damage as the residual effects that occur
once the “limits to adaptation” have been reached. This concept of “limits to adaptation”
is the subject of a considerable body of literature which is highly relevant to Loss and
Damage. Scholarship on limits to adaptation considers the presence of key vulnerabilities
and tipping points which, should they be exceeded, would pose significant threats to
human and ecological welfare (Dow et al., 2013).
Uncertainty about the relationship of Loss and Damage to other agendas extends
to the WIM itself, where, although the preamble refers explicitly to the “beyond
adaptation” conceptualization of loss and damage, the rest of the policy outlines a
program more aligned with reducing the risk of [loss and damage]” (McNamara &
Jackson, 2019a). In reality, the lines between the mitigation, adaptation, and Loss and
Damage agendas may be economic or political in nature, involving socio-cultural and
institutional factors as well as biophysical and technical ones (Broberg, 2020b). As such,
those lines, as suggested above, may be easily blurred.
1.3 CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION
In addition to challenges presented by vague definitions of Loss and Damage,
there are many outstanding questions about how the issue is framed, and how the
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specifics of potential policy mechanisms to address losses and damages look in practice.
Implementation of the WIM is carried out by the WIM Executive Committee, which aims
to address the potentially unavoidable climate-related losses and damages through five
workstreams, which include addressing slow onset events, non-economic loss and
damage, comprehensive risk management, human mobility, and action and support
(UNFCCC, 2020). This body, which operates under the guidance of the Conference of
Parties, is comprised of a 20-member panel of 10 annex 1 and 10 non-annex 11 country
representatives and is responsible for implementing the mechanism’s three main
functions outlined above (UNFCCC, 2020). James et al. (2014) note a fundamental,
overarching question relevant to implementation of the WIM’s work, however: which
losses and damages are pertinent to the Loss and Damage mechanism? What counts as
loss and damage from climate change?
One of the most significant implementation challenges faced by the WIM is noneconomic loss and damage, or “NELD.” A key consideration of the WIM and a top
priority among its five workstreams, NELD includes the material and non-material
dimensions of loss and damage that defy quantification or monetization, such as the loss
of cultural heritage, traditional knowledge or place identity that may leave communities
disconnected from their sense of self and each other (Serdeczny et al., 2016). In their
poignant illustration of “one thousand ways to experience loss,” Tschakert et al. (2019)
suggest that attempts to assess losses and damages via purely economic metrics tend to
fall woefully short of capturing their true extent. Such efforts, they argue, gloss over the
non-quantifiable dimensions of harm “that are no less significant to people within their
own contexts,” (McShane, 2017; Preston, 2017; in Tschakert et al., 2019, p.59)
Anticipating and estimating NELD for policy and planning purposes is extremely
challenging due to the complexities of social interactions, difficulty of quantification, and
1

Annex 1 parties include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT
Parties), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European
States. Non-Annex I parties are primarily developing countries. The Convention emphasizes activities that
promise to answer the special needs and concerns of these vulnerable countries, such as investment,
insurance, and technology transfer
(UNFCCC, 2020c).
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uncertainties associated with climate projections. This creates significant difficulty in
generating sound estimates to serve as a basis for decision-making (Serdeczny et al.,
2016). Scown et al. (2022) highlight a critical roadblock regarding efforts to address
NELDs: there are virtually no records of NELDs globally. This absence of both data on
NELDs, and general discourse on NELD within Loss and Damage policy arenas
represents a significant blind spot, hindering our ability to understand and address Loss
and Damage and keeping the focus (and potential solutions) trained on a narrow
economic conceptualization of losses and damages globally (Scown et al., 2022;
Tschakert et al., 2019).
Another challenge to implementation lies in the differential strategies necessitated
by various types of climatic events. Loss and damage as defined by the UNFCCC
encompasses the effects of both slow onset and extreme events linked to climate change.
The definition of slow onset events includes desertification, glacial retreat and related
impacts, land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity, ocean acidification, increasing
temperatures and sea level rise (UNFCCC, 2012). Acute or rapid onset events, on the
other hand, include heat waves, tropical cyclones, storm surges, droughts, and floods
(UNFCCC, 2012). Huggel et al. (2013) suggest that strategies to cope with each differ,
with approaches to addressing slow onset event less well defined than risk management
plans for extreme weather events. There has been discussion in recent years, for example,
about the suitability of insurance to manage slow onset events in vulnerable countries.
Traditional loss-based insurance may not be suitable to insure against longer term
foreseeable climatic stressors because slow-onset events fail two preconditions for
insurability: unpredictability of an event (losses should be sudden and cannot be
foreseen) and ability to spread risk over time and regions (Kehinde, 2014). In other
words, the slow predictability of changes like sea level rise and desertification, combined
with the global reach of their effects, mean that solutions other than traditional insurance
will be necessary to address these slow-onset events. Proponents of comprehensive
climate risk management (CRM) approaches have proposed various frameworks to
address these challenges. For example, Schinko et al. (2019) suggest the “risk layering”
approach (Mechler et al., 2014) for operationalizing CRM in the context of Loss and
Damage. This concept involves identifying efficient and acceptable interventions based
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on recurrence as well as severity of climate-related risks. The risk layering approach
involves segmenting risk into acceptable, tolerable and intolerable layers and allocating
roles and responsibilities to reduce, finance or accept risks (Schinko et al., 2019). Such
approaches again raise an important question, however: “acceptable, tolerable, and
intolerable for whom?”
Additionally, the role of responsibility for climate-related harms, particularly as
it relates to financial compensation, presents one of the most contentious struggles in the
evolution of Loss and Damage policy globally. Loss and Damage negotiations are
frequently torn between demands for climate justice and the reluctance of other parties to
consider actions to address Loss and Damage outside of an adaptation framework
(Schinko et al., 2019). Perceptions of climate justice as it relates to responsibility vary:
some frame it primarily as a financial matter, centering on compensation by highemitting nations for increases in extreme or slow onset related risk (Schinko et al., 2019).
More holistic definitions of climate justice, however, frame the issue as an existential
matter, requiring examination of the underlying drivers of loss and damage (Boyd et al.,
2021). Viewed from this perspective, losses and damages often cannot be tied solely to
climate change, but are “entangled with layers of entrenched vulnerabilities as well as
other drivers that produce uneven outcomes and future risks” (Tschakert et al., 2019, p.
69). This perspective places an emphasis on addressing both historic harms associated
with uneven greenhouse gas emissions and on the restrictions faced by vulnerable people
in adapting to climate change (Boyd et al., 2021). Such divergent perspectives on liability
and compensation (payments and who pays) as opposed to adaptation, disaster risk
management and insurance (pre-emptive programs) present a challenge for the WIM
Executive Committee, whose current work program balances the two perspectives
without explicitly referring to justice and equity principles (Schinko et al., 2019), a
challenge many scholars find impossible.
Finally, the numerous drivers of disproportionate vulnerability to climate change
add layers of complexity on the study of losses and damages and the administration of
Loss and Damage policy. Differential vulnerability of human populations to climate
change results from a wide array of social, economic, historical and political factors, all
of which operate in different and complex interacting ways across scales (Thomas et al.,
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2019). Such drivers of change, which include but are not limited to hyper-neoliberal
policies, poor land use choices and legacies, institutionalized marginalization, and the
inequitable influence of state policies, exacerbate the impacts of climate change and
therefore drive losses and damages in step with the actual impacts of climatic events
themselves. Understanding the complex interactions of climatic events, underlying
drivers of vulnerability, and resulting losses and damages presents a formidable challenge
for researchers seeking to untangle these relationships.
1.4 THE ROLE OF EVENT ATTRIBUTION IN LOSS AND DAMAGE
The research field of event attribution, which focuses on attributing the increased
severity and/or frequency of individual weather events to the presence of anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions, has become a central focus in the Loss and Damage debate.
The potential role of event attribution in establishing a basis for loss and damage
compensation has become highly politicized (James et al., 2014), and developed nations
including the United States have pushed back forcibly against its inclusion in Loss and
Damage negotiations, frequently labeling them a distraction from adaptation and
mitigation efforts (Jézéquel et al., 2018). Despite the contentious nature of the attribution
subject, James et al. (2014) point out that the question of causality cannot be avoided
forever. Considering the UNFCCC’s mandate to tackle anthropogenic interference with
the climate system, one of its largest outstanding challenges is to estimate where and
when losses and damages can be attributed to climate change.
The sophistication of attribution science has evolved significantly over the past
decade, as recently evidenced by the rapid attribution of the 2021 heatwave in the
Northwestern United States and Canada (Philip et al., 2021). The process of attributing an
extreme event to climate change, as outlined by Philip et al. (2020) in reference to the
World Weather Attribution (WWA) initiative’s methodology, is a complex, eight-step
undertaking. In simplified terms, the WWA method entails determining the spatial and
temporal extent of the extreme event in question, determining whether the event exhibits
a trend above natural variability, and using physical climate models to attribute any
detected change in the event’s probability and intensity to anthropogenic forcing (Philip
et al., 2020; WWA, 2021). Multiple approaches to attribution are outlined within the
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literature. One such framing is a risk-based approach, which answers the question of
attribution probabilistically, in terms of the likelihood of a given event occurring, and
treats natural climate variability as background noise (Shepherd, 2016). A second
framing, termed the “storyline approach,” looks alternatively at various factors
contributing to the occurrence of the event in question, including but not limited to
natural variability (Shepherd, 2016).
As event attribution capabilities have blossomed, so have the debates regarding its
potential role in connecting losses and damages to anthropogenic climate change.
Although some scholars have voiced enthusiasm about the potential of attribution to
support informed policymaking (Huggel et al., 2013b) and foster restorative justice by
holding historic emitters accountable (Jézéquel et al., 2018), a number of critiques have
also been levied at this potential application. One such critique centers on the inequities
present in observation and attribution of extreme events. Huggel et al. (2016) affirm that
the most vulnerable countries globally are those for which extreme event attributability is
the lowest. Their analysis of attributed impacts (based on the IPCC AR5 report (IPCC,
2014)) revealed that over 60% of attributed impacts considered came from Annex-1
nations, whereas Annex-2 nations represented less than 40% of observations and least
developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) totaled less than
20% of detected and attributed events combined. A second critique suggests that
establishing liability for attributable events should be a secondary concern; that losses
and damages also occur due to natural climate variability, and that a fixation on the
attributable fraction of loss and damage would subvert proactive measures to minimize
and avert loss and damage in the first place (Wallimann-Helmer, 2015). Additionally,
Roberts & Pelling (2018) suggest that, given the many challenges to operationalization
that event attribution still faces, it should by no means constitute a pre-requisite for global
action on loss and damage. Support should be given foremost to the most vulnerable, not
the most attributable. Finally, Scown et al. (2022) highlight an imbalance regarding
attribution: not only does the ability to perform such studies rest primarily in developed
countries, but those same developed countries have also largely been the focus of
completed studies to date. This indicates a misalignment between the attribution of
climatic events and the regions known to be most vulnerable globally.
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1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There seems to be a pressing question of “now what” looming over the issue of
Loss and Damage. How will the WIM and the topic of Loss and Damage be addressed
and implemented, not only globally, but regionally, nationally, and locally? How will
outstanding questions about the specifics of Loss and Damage be answered at these
various scales? As Kreienkamp & Vanhala (2017) suggest, there are viable ways to move
forward with addressing Loss and Damage, but without strong international support, such
efforts will remain an empty policy prescription for much of the world hard hit by climate
change. As an international framework, the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss
and Damage (WIM) exists for the purposes of coordinating Loss and Damage efforts at
the global scale, however significant knowledge gaps remain regarding how (and even if)
Loss and Damage is implemented in policy by individual nation-states, as well as how
actual harms linked to climate-related events manifest across geographic contexts.
Currently, few policy mechanisms exist that explicitly address losses and
damages at the level of national governments; most mechanisms rely on the processes
and politics of international climate governance. The most notable exception is the
country of Bangladesh, which has made considerable strides towards developing a
national mechanism to address Loss and Damage from climate change (Haque et al.,
2019; Huq et al., 2016). Although many other nations may have policies in place which
address some portions of the global Loss and Damage agenda through a focus on climate
governance generally, these national policies may be framed differently; couched as
adaptation or disaster risk reduction rather than Loss and Damage explicitly. Global Loss
and Damage strategies have been studied with increasing frequency within climate policy
research circles (Tschakert et al., 2019), however this relative abundance of studies
highlights a glaring void: there’s a comparative paucity of knowledge about how
national-level actors approach the Loss and Damage problem (Vanhala et al., 2021).
Citing recent developments in UNFCCC negotiations and within the literature, Calliari &
Vanhala (2022) suggest the emergence of a “national turn” in Loss and Damage
governance. The authors raise important questions regarding how national policymakers
conceptualize Loss and Damage, highlighting the importance of understanding where
Loss and Damage is included (or not) within the landscape of national-level climate
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governance (Calliari & Vanhala, 2022). Addressing this gap in the collective knowledge
of Loss and Damage is essential, not least because the impacts of climate change are
inherently multi-scalar and political (Adger et al., 2005; Hall & Persson, 2018; Javeline et
al., 2014 as cited in Vanhala et al., 2021), necessitating different strategies to address
them at various scales of governance. To this end, examining how existing country-level
institutions currently respond to climate-related disasters in ways that deal with losses
and damages will be essential in supporting Loss and Damage policymaking from the
global to the local level (Calliari & Vanhala, 2022).
In addition to lacking studies on national mechanisms, the Loss and Damage
literature has historically contained few empirical investigations regarding how climaterelated harms are manifesting globally (van der Geest & Warner, 2015; Warner & van
der Geest, 2013). To date, most Loss and Damage research has been theoretical, focused
on conceptualizations of loss and damage from a variety of perspectives and linkages to
other policy frameworks, with significantly less empirical research (McNamara &
Jackson, 2019 as cited in Thomas et al., 2020). Despite this historic lack of empirical loss
and damage research, studies are beginning to emerge which investigate different types
of loss and damage across contexts (Calliari & Vanhala, 2022; Cunsolo & Ellis, 2018;
Tschakert et al., 2019). Other studies are attempting to frame the impacts of extreme
events as losses and damages (or not) relative to mitigation and adaptation measures by
leveraging various methodologies and data types (Boda & Scown, 2021; Scown et al.,
2022). The lack of empirical knowledge about losses and damages extends to numerous
aspects of the Loss and Damage debate, including NELDs and attribution science (Scown
et al., 2022), limiting the capacity for informed policymaking regarding these topics.
Although the origins of Loss and Damage policy and scholarship are primarily concerned
with climate-related harms in the Global South, the current expansion of empirical
research on losses and damages will likely lead to continued explorations across
geographic and development contexts. The specifics of losses and damages as
experienced vary greatly from place to place, and the continued evolution of scholarship
may be central to supporting a parallel evolution within global Loss and Damage policy
to address losses and damages when adaptation and mitigation fail, an occurrence present
far beyond the Global South.
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Augmenting the body of empirical studies documenting climate-related harms is
critical to improving our understanding of losses and damages globally and will
additionally be relevant to capturing progress on Loss and Damage within the 2023
global stocktake of the Paris Agreement (Thomas et al., 2020). More importantly,
however, empirical information on loss and damage will aid in identification of the types
of action and support needed, what works and in which contexts, and how such action
and support can be delivered (Thomas et al., 2020). If a truly global understanding of loss
and damage is to be pursued, bridging the gaps in the areas of collective knowledge
articulated above will be immensely important. In this thesis, I explore questions relevant
to both gaps: first, the paucity of research on national-level Loss and Damage
mechanisms and, second, the adjacent lack of scholarship empirically examining losses
and damages.
1. How does the global Loss and Damage agenda influence national-level policy
responses to climate change?
a. How are global Loss and Damage concepts and approaches incorporated
into national-level climate policies?
2. How are losses and damages perceived and experienced differently across
geographic contexts, specifically in places not generally associated with global
Loss and Damage?
b. How are losses and damages linked to extreme climatic events perceived
and experienced in a rural, agricultural landscape of a developed nation?
1.6 ROADMAP TO EXPLORING LOSS AND DAMAGE IN THIS THESIS
As outlined above, this thesis is comprised of two independent but related studies
regarding two gaps in the Loss and Damage literature. The investigation regarding the
first gap leans on the possibility that, although only a few countries globally have
explicitly implemented dedicated Loss and Damage policies, others may exist that are not
explicitly couched in the UNFCCC language of Loss and Damage. To this end, Chapter 2
leverages national-level climate policy documents to explore policies not specifically
framed as Loss and Damage mechanisms, but nonetheless with the potential to address
losses and damages, offering insights into how alternative approaches to addressing Loss
and Damage at the national level might look. Using an analysis of five national-level
climate policies from the South American nation of Chile, this chapter explores potential
12

national-level Loss and Damage mechanisms not explicitly identified as such. Chile is
well-positioned regarding this exploration, being both particularly vulnerable to myriad
climate impacts and poised at a watershed moment of new and forthcoming climate
policies with the potential to address losses and damages. I apply a framework to the
Chilean policy documents designed to detect evidence relevant to the major aspects of
modern global climate policy, aiming to gauge parallels to the global Loss and Damage
policy agenda.
Chapter 3 addresses the second major gap in the Loss and Damage scholarship
through an empirical exploration of losses and damages vis-à-vis survey data collected
from agricultural producers across eastern Montana, USA. Eastern Montana, along with
much of the northwestern United States and southwestern Canada, experienced a recordbreaking heatwave in June of 2021, the severity of which was the subject of an attribution
study conducted shortly thereafter (Philip et al., 2021). Importantly, although this survey
is framed around respondents’ experiences with extreme events, this focus does not
preclude consideration of slow-onset events. Rather, it serves to make legible the human
influence on the climate system by focusing on acute weather events and perceptions of
their increasing frequency and severity over time. Although a study of losses and
damages in the developed USA is not in the original spirit of the Loss and Damage
agenda, it nonetheless holds value for the reasons outlined above. As our collective
understanding of losses and damages evolves, it will be important to conceptualize how
climate impacts beyond those mitigated or adapted to manifest in contexts beyond the
Global South. A more thorough understanding thereof can help inform and evolve the
debate about both losses and damages -and Loss and Damage policy- both globally and at
the national level.
Although this survey was intended to be deployed in Chile to empirically assess
loss and damage from prolonged drought, University and global travel restrictions linked
to the COVID-19 pandemic made deployment of meaningful survey or interview
research in Chile infeasible. Each chapter is presented in this thesis as a standalone peerreviewed manuscript, complete with a full description of methods employed in each
phase of the research. Much of the work conducted was a modification to initially
proposed research due to the challenges presented by the pandemic. Although the final
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research design yielded valuable results, future research on these topics would benefit
from the inclusion of in-person, qualitative interviews across both the national contexts
(Chile and USA) investigated. Importantly, this research was conducted in conjunction
with a global effort investigating the disproportionate impacts of climate extremes
(DICE) across multiple national contexts. The insights and expertise of DICE researchers
have been central informing my own understanding of Loss and Damage and were
instrumental in designing and reviewing the survey deployed in eastern Montana (USA).
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2. EXPLORING LOSS AND DAMAGE IN CHILEAN CLIMATE POLICY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Societal recognition of anthropogenic climate change’s acceleration over recent
decades has been accompanied by a constellation of debates regarding how to address its
many impacts. Long conceptualized as a largely scientific challenge, climate change in
reality represents a “conundrum of politics and justice” which cannot be addressed
through scientific or technical solutions alone (Tanner et al., 2015, p. 23). Today,
greenhouse gas emissions from industrialized nations, which dwarf those from the
developing world, have been causally linked to slow-onset trends such as sea level rise
and increased incidences and severity of acute climate-related events, with the most
vulnerable nations and people globally bearing the brunt of resulting harms (Stott et al.,
2016; Tschakert et al., 2019; Tschakert et al., 2017). Currently, the “Loss and Damage”
agenda of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
serves as a mechanism for addressing those harms linked to anthropogenic climate
change which exceed the capacity of mitigation and adaptation strategies to prevent their
occurrence (James et al., 2014). Although mitigation and adaptation mechanisms,
including programs, processes, funding, and policies remain critical to limiting future
global harms as a result of climate change, losses and damages will occur as extreme and
slow-onset events such as sea level rise continue to surpass human capacities to prepare,
avoid, and adapt (Roberts & Pelling, 2018).
Policy mechanisms addressing Loss and Damage at the international level are the
rapidly increasing object of academic attention (Calliari, 2018; Tschakert et al., 2019).
Research on Loss and Damage policy mechanisms at the national level, however, are
sparse (Vanhala et al., 2021), despite the recent assertion of scholars that a “national
turn” for Loss and Damage is imminent (Calliari & Vanhala, 2022). One of the few
anomalies is the country of Bangladesh, which has made significant progress towards
developing a national Loss and Damage mechanism designed around a centralized
framework for accounting, coordinating, disbursing finance, and evaluating programs that
address climate-related losses and damages (Haque et al., 2019). The gap in national Loss
and Damage scholarship is due in part to the nature of the international agenda, whose
global scope doesn’t explicitly facilitate its inclusion in national policy agendas.
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Regardless, Roberts & Pelling (2018) suggest that Loss and Damage is set to have
increasing meaning and value at the national scale given the distinctly national threats
posed by climate change (loss of statehood, for example), which make addressing Loss
and Damage a particularly urgent challenge for individual countries. Improving our
understanding of national strategies that respond to climatic events can provide insight
into different approaches to Loss and Damage globally, as well as potential synergies
across levels of governance.
Given the dearth of research on Loss and Damage mechanisms at the national
level, there are many outstanding questions about how individual countries approach the
harms imposed by climate change within their national borders. In this paper, I explore 1)
how climate-related losses and damages are addressed in South American country of
Chile, a nation with no explicit Loss and Damage policy mechanism in place, and 2)
whether and how elements of the global Loss and Damage agenda manifest within
Chile’s national-level climate polices. To do so, I conducted a textual analysis of five
national-level climate policies in Chile, which serves as a fitting study location given the
nation’s current climatic and political contexts, which include severe ongoing drought
and recent proliferation of national climate policies. This investigation is both timely and
relevant given the IPCC AR6 projections, which reveal that global temperatures will
continue to rise until at least mid-century, with changes in the earth’s climate system- and
associated climatic events- becoming more extreme in direct relation to warming (IPCC,
2021). Generation of knowledge surrounding national strategies to address climate harms
–and the potential synergies of those strategies with the global Loss and Damage
agenda—represent important steps toward a cohesive global approach to addressing loss
and damage.
2.2 BACKGROUND
2.2.1 WHAT IS LOSS AND DAMAGE?
Loss and Damage exists today as a third pillar of international climate policy
alongside the adaptation and mitigation agendas of the UNFCCC. The term Loss and
Damage has come to represent both a policy mechanism and the sum of impacts inflicted
by climate-related events (Boyd et al., 2021). Considering the dual nature of the term and
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following van der Geest & Warner (2020), I use the lower case ‘loss and damage’ to refer
to the actual harms resulting from both extreme and slow-onset climatic events and the
upper case ‘Loss and Damage’ to refer to the associated debate over policy strategies to
address losses and damages. A short history of Loss and Damage policy and the
challenges inherent in its implementation follow below.
2.2.2 THE EVOLUTION OF LOSS AND DAMAGE
Conceptually, Loss and Damage first emerged in 1991 as a proposal from the
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) (Broberg & Romera, 2020). The proposal,
which called in part for an international insurance pool to support low-lying nation states
affected by sea level rise, represented the beginning of ongoing debates about
responsibility for climate-related harms (Broberg, 2020). Since 1991, the concept of Loss
and Damage has slowly gained traction, first appearing in a negotiated UNFCCC
decision (the Bali Action Plan) in 2007, then continuing to inclusion in the 2010 Cancun
Adaptation Framework and the 2012 Doha Gateway decision (Kreienkamp & Vanhala,
2017; Vulturius & Davis, 2016). Loss and Damage was first established as a dedicated
policy mechanism at the 19th conference of parties (COP-19) in Poland, under the
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), and was formally
enshrined in policy at COP-21 under the 2015 Paris Agreement (Calliari, 2018). The
agenda has since been highlighted in the establishment of the Santiago Network for Loss
and Damage at COP-25 in Madrid (2019) and recently at COP-26 in Glasgow (2021)
where, although the issue was squarely in the spotlight, national monetary contributions
were minimal and a much-anticipated finance facility dedicated to Loss and Damage was
never established (Mountford, 2021; Pill, 2022). Although it can be argued that strategies
to avert and minimize loss and damage are currently being undertaken globally, there are
many who claim that actual actions addressing climate-related losses and damages are
still lacking (Pill, 2022).
2.2.3 DEFINITIONS, PERCEPTIONS & CHALLENGES
Although Loss and Damage has gained increasing attention in both research and
policy circles in recent years (Calliari, 2018; Tschakert et al., 2019), it remains a poorly
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defined concept, with no officially agreed-upon definition established within the
literature (Boda et al., 2021; Boyd et al., 2017) or by the UNFCCC itself (Vanhala et al.,
2021). Additionally, some studies have distinguished between the terms “loss” and
“damage,” framing losses as permanent or irreversible and damages as reversible (Doelle
& Seck, 2019; McNamara & Jackson, 2019; Tschakert et al., 2019; van der Geest &
Warner, 2020), while others, particularly in climate negotiations, frame the two as a
single concept (Broberg, 2020b; Fankhauser et al., 2014).
The absence of a clear definition has spurred numerous debates across the
literature with regard to what Loss and Damage is, and how the established Loss and
Damage agenda relates to other international climate policy objectives, such as mitigation
and adaptation (Boyd et al., 2017) leading to a variety of challenges regarding its
implementation. One of the most significant implementation challenges for WIM is how
to address non-economic loss and damage, or NELD, which includes the elements of loss
and damage that defy quantification or monetization and represents an urgent priority of
the WIM Executive Committee (Serdeczny et al., 2016). Combined with a lack of
information on NELDs globally (Scown et al., 2022), the difficulty in anticipating and
estimating NELDs makes related planning and policy formation extremely challenging
(Serdeczny et al., 2016). Another challenge to implementation lies in the differential
strategies necessitated by various types of climatic events. Strategies to cope with acute
events (i.e., hurricanes), for example, are much different from those needed to cope with
slow-onset events like sea level rise (Huggel et al., 2013). Finally, questions of
responsibility are hotly contested in Loss and Damage negotiations, which are frequently
torn between demands for compensation for climate harms and the reluctance of
developed nation parties to consider actions addressing Loss and Damage outside of an
adaptation framework (Schinko et al., 2019). Event attribution science, which focuses on
attributing the increased severity of individual weather events to the presence of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, has become central to this debate, however
developed nations resisting notions of liability frequently label them a distraction from
adaptation and mitigation efforts (Jézéquel et al., 2018). Despite the contentious nature of
the attribution subject, however, James et al. (2014) point out that the question of
causality cannot be ducked forever.
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2.2.4 THE NATIONAL MECHANISMS GAP
Global Loss and Damage strategies have been studied with increasing frequency
within climate policy research circles (Tschakert et al., 2019), however this relative
abundance of studies highlights a glaring void: there’s a comparative paucity of
knowledge about how national-level actors and institutions approach the Loss and
Damage problem (Vanhala et al., 2021). Although many nations may have policies in
place which address some portions of the global Loss and Damage agenda, these national
policies are generally framed differently; couched as adaptation or disaster risk reduction
(DRR) rather than Loss and Damage explicitly. The most notable exception to the
national mechanisms gap is the country of Bangladesh, where a proposed framework that
works towards addressing loss and damage is under development (Haque et al., 2019).
The nation’s direct actions toward addressing loss and damage via collaboration across
government ministries and disaster response platforms have been the subject of several
publications (Haque et al., 2019; Huq et al., 2016). These recent studies on Bangladesh
may represent the leading edge of what Calliari & Vanhala (2022) describe as a “national
turn” in research on Loss and Damage, in which an emerging body of scholarship
explores how the Loss and Damage concept is understood among national-level policy
actors. This body of work collectively suggests the utility of empirical evidence for
understanding how Loss and Damage as a governance challenge originating in the global
climate regime is translated into national policy processes (Calliari & Vanhala, 2022;
Roberts & Pelling, 2018; Vanhala et al., 2021).
The impacts of climate change are, by their nature, political and highly variable
across biophysical scales (Adger et al., 2005; Hall & Persson, 2018; Javeline et al., 2014
as cited in Vanhala et al., 2021). These impacts present a distinct threat to individual
nations and their institutions, impeding national development strategies while
simultaneously and paradoxically requiring implementation of development strategies to
address them (Roberts & Pelling, 2018). Accordingly, an improved understanding of how
national actors are working to address climate harms is an important piece of the global
Loss and Damage puzzle. Many questions remain about how to address the growing and
highly disproportionate impacts of climate change across geographies and levels of
governance. These outstanding questions render the national mechanisms knowledge and
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implementation gap a critical one to bridge, highlighting the need to understand how
losses and damages, accelerating in step with anthropogenic climate change, will be
addressed not only globally, but nationally and regionally as well.
2.2.5 STUDY “LOCATION”
Several characteristics make Chile an ideal focal subject for an exploration of
national Loss and Damage mechanisms. Under criteria developed by the UNFCCC, Chile
is a country highly vulnerable to climate change, encompassing low-lying coastal areas,
arid and semi-arid zones, forest areas, areas prone to drought, and mountain ecosystems
within its boundaries, among many others (Gobierno de Chile, 2014). Much of Chile has
experienced an uninterrupted sequence of dry years since 2010, with mean rainfall
deficits of 20–40%. This ‘Megadrought,’ as it has been termed, is Chile’s longest drought
event on record, with few analogues in the last millennia (Garreaud et al., 2020). The
Center for Climate and Resilience Research (2015) in Chile estimates the contribution of
anthropogenic forcing to the Megadrought to be 25%, indicating that a large fraction of
the Megadrought’s severity would not be actualized without anthropogenic climate
forcing. In addition, Chile appears to be at a watershed moment regarding its national
strategies to confront climate change. The country has recently drafted or renewed
several national-level climate policies, and a draft framework climate change law is
currently under discussion in Congress (Gómez de Cuenca, 2021). Additionally, In
October of 2020 and in the wake of unprecedented social unrest, a large percentage of
Chileans (nearly 80%) voted in favor of a referendum to draft a new national constitution
(Berasaluce et al., 2021). Drafting of the new constitution, combined with the election of
progressive candidate Gabriel Boric to the presidency, is expected by some to produce a
shift away from Chile’s neoliberal past2 and towards a serious reckoning with climate
change and its associated environmental concerns (Casals, 2022). Given the current
climatic and political context in Chile, the country appears to have both the motivation
(general vulnerability to climate change, successful attribution of the Megadrought) and

2

Chile’s current social and physical landscapes have been shaped by a complex political economic history
which resulted in extractive resource policies designed to spur rapid economic expansion (Carruthers,
2001; Latta & Aguayo, 2012). A full account of Chile’s environmental history is beyond the scope of this
paper., however a basic understanding of this history will provide readers with valuable context.

20

the means (new and forthcoming climate policies, constitutional reform) to join a roster
of nations crafting strategies to confront loss and damage within their borders. This
combination provides a unique and timely opportunity to examine current policy
responses to climate change, and potentially loss and damage, at the national level in
Chile.
2.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As numerous studies have affirmed, Loss and Damage is a poorly defined concept
within the UNFCCC and beyond (Boda et al., 2021; Boyd et al., 2017). The umbrella of
Loss and Damage within scholarly literature encompasses a wide range of policy issues,
spanning domains including disaster risk management while also engaging with the limits
to adaptation (Vanhala et al., 2021). Contrasting Chilean climate policies with the global
Loss and Damage agenda, therefore, means capturing the range of issues that fall under
this broad umbrella. After considerable literature review, no clear framework exists for
evaluating explicit, potential, or implicit Loss and Damage mechanisms in national-level
climate policy. Thus, I rely here on the Loss and Damage literature to design a
comprehensive framework for this analysis. To cast the necessary wide net, I assembled
essential elements of four policy domains that comprehensively define the global Loss
and Damage agenda (Table 2.1). From these, I created an analytical framework to apply
to the context and content of national climate policy documents to identify and compare
critical elements of the global Loss and Damage agenda at the national level.
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Table 2.1: Categories, descriptions and key references for the theoretical framework used to assess Chilean
climate policies for similarity to the global Loss and Damage policy agenda

Category

Event attribution

Description
Event attribution science leverages climate models under various
greenhouse gas scenarios to determine the probability of a climatic event
exceeding a certain intensity. Attribution of losses and damages to climate
change requires attribution of weather events to anthropogenic climate
forcing and subsequent attribution of losses and damages to the weather
event in question. This has been a contentious subject in Loss and Damage
negotiations given its frequent association with principles of liability and
compensation. Given the mandate of the UNFCCC to address anthropogenic
interference with the climate system, however, attribution is of high
relevance to both the UNFCCC and the WIM.

Losses and
damages
Identifiers: Losses
and damages
(general), NELD,
Slow-onset events

Refers to recorded losses and damages resulting directly from a climate
change-attributable event. This may include climate-related harms referred
to as "beyond" or "exceeding limits" to adaptation, per the separation of the
Loss and Damage and adaptation agendas under the 2015 UNFCCC Paris
Agreement. Economic and non-economic losses and damages are both
explicitly considered by the WIM and may be alternately referred to as
tangible and intangible losses and damages. The WIM also differentiates
between losses and damages from slow onset vs. acute events.

Risk management
Identifiers: risk
management
(general) risk
assessment, risk
reduction, risk
transfer, risk
retention

Risk is generally understood as a function of an event’s probability and
consequences, as well as exposure and vulnerability of assets. The WIM
Excom identifies comprehensive risk management (CRM) as one of its
primary functions relative to addressing Loss and Damage, and outlines the
strategies encompassed therein as risk assessment, risk reduction, risk
transfer and risk retention. Much of the scholarly Loss and Damage
literature supports the relevance of such comprehensive risk management
strategies in addressing Loss and Damage.

Social
development
Identifiers:
Education, Gender
equity, Health,
Poverty reduction,
Vulnerability

The five-year workplan of the WIM ExCom identifies the need to address
the disproportionate vulnerability of populations due to their geography,
socioeconomic status, livelihood, gender, age, indigenous or minority status
or disability; and the ecosystems that they depend on. The WIM’s focus on
addressing disproportionate vulnerability is reflected within the scholarly
Loss and Damage literature, within which Loss and Damage has been
framed as the “failure of sustainable development.” The “human
development” approach currently represents the most advanced perspective
on sustainable development and is identified as relevant for informing the
development and implementation of Loss and Damage policy. This
approach focuses on the most vulnerable in society and on freedoms to
achieve desired capacities well-being. This approach employs a complex
dashboard of indicators to assess wellbeing, including but not limited to
achievements in education and health, economic performance,
environmental quality, and political freedom.
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Key
References
Huggel et al.
(2016)
James et al.
(2014)
Otto et al. (2018)
Philip et al. (2020)
Stott et al. (2016)

Serdeczny et al.
(2016, 2018)
Tschakert et al.
(2019)
UNFCCC Guide
to Loss and
Damage (2020)

Huggel et al.
(2013)
Kehinde (2014)
WIM
Compendium on
CRM (2019)

Aleksandrova &
Costella (2021)
Boda et al. (2020)
Boda et al. (2021)
Roberts & Pelling
(2018)

These Loss and Damage elements provide the basis for a set of framework
categories, related identifiers, and associated search terms with which to assess each
Chilean policy. The framework contains four primary categories: event attribution, losses
and damages, risk management, and social development. Under these primary categories
are a total of 13 identifiers, which serve to refine the analysis, capturing thematic material
within the policy documents that relates to each primary category. Collectively, the
framework and categories address a gap in policy research captured by Thomas et al.
(2020), who note that framing Loss and Damage research in the language of the
UNFCCC may help foster a more cohesive understanding of Loss and Damage, while
making scholarship relevant for the UNFCCC, the WIM Executive Committee, and the
2023 Paris Agreement global stocktake. Below, I develop each framework category
independently using the relevant supporting literature.
2.3.1 EVENT ATTRIBUTION
One of the thorniest questions in global Loss and Damage negotiations revolves
around whether and/or how to establish responsibility for the impacts of climate-related
events by first attributing an event’s severity or probabilistic variation to anthropogenic
forcing (James et al., 2014; Stott et al., 2016). This determination is central to the Loss
and Damage debate, as the losses and damages addressed by the WIM are specifically
those resulting from anthropogenic forcing; if an event’s severity or probability is not
thus attributed, by definition it cannot cause losses and damages. The emerging field of
event attribution science makes addressing these questions more feasible (Swain et al.,
2020), however many developed-nation parties to the UNFCCC approach attribution with
reticence, often associating it with potential responsibility, blame, and eventual
compensation (Schinko et al., 2019). Although the current framing of Article 8 of the
Paris Agreement provides no basis for liability or compensation, the question of causality
(and thus responsibility), as James et al. (2014) point out, can’t be avoided forever.
Considering the UNFCCC’s mandate to tackle anthropogenic interference with the
climate system (James et al., 2014), attribution will remain a central consideration of the
WIM and is therefore an essential component of this framework. In the analysis process, I
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reviewed each policy for direct references to attribution studies or explicit connections
between losses and damages and extreme events via attribution studies.
2.3.2 LOSSES AND DAMAGES
In assessing Chile’s policy responses to climate change for similarities to the
international Loss and Damage agenda, it was necessary to explore whether actual
climate-related harms are discussed in terms akin to those employed by the UNFCCC.
This objective led to three specific identifiers under the losses and damages framework
category, as well as a general losses and damages identifier which captured content
relevant to climate harms that did not fit within the specific identifiers
The first specific identifier concerns NELDs, which, as noted previously, are at
the forefront of work under the WIM ExCom and represent the body’s fourth action area
(Huggel et al., 2019). Within this action area, the WIM identifies three categories of
NELD: individual, societal, and environmental (UNFCCC, 2020). NELD entails losses of
things or values not traded in markets that nonetheless are highly relevant to those
affected (Boyd et al., 2021). These material and immaterial losses and damages include
but are not limited to loss of human life, biodiversity, cultural heritage, traditional
knowledge or place identity (Serdeczny et al., 2016; Serdeczny et al., 2018). Given the
centrality of NELD to the work of the WIM ExCom, this identifier aims to capture policy
content regarding non-quantifiable harms which fit within the WIM’s three identified
NELD categories.
Additionally, global Loss and Damage policy grapples with how to address
impacts resulting from slow onset as well as extreme events. Slow-onset events require
different response strategies than do extreme events, being less easily addressed through
strategies such as traditional insurance (Huggel et al., 2013). Slow-onset events comprise
one of the workstreams of the WIM, under which the ExCom aims to better understand
and enhance capacities to address them, particularly at regional and national levels
(UNFCCC, 2020). As such, the inclusion of this identifier captures policy content related
to this focal area of the WIM, looking specifically for recognition of the eight types of
slow-onset events identified by the ExCom (UNFCCC, 2020).
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Finally, although the relationship of the Loss and Damage and adaptation agendas
is contested within the scholarly literature (Boyd et al., 2017; Broberg, 2020), their
explicit separation under the 2015 Paris Agreement speaks to a clear distinction between
the agendas under the UNFCCC (Calliari & Vanhala, 2022). The establishment of
separate roles for adaptation and Loss and Damage has played out against the backdrop
of a growing body of literature exploring the limits of adaptation (Adger et al., 2009).
Considering the UNFCCC distinction between the agendas and considering the expansion
of literature supporting the possibility of climate-related impacts which surpass
adaptation capabilities, the final identifier is intended to capture policy content in which
climate-related harms are discussed as beyond adaptation, or in any way exceeding
Chile’s national capacities to adapt.
2.3.3 RISK MANAGEMENT
Significant tensions frequently arise between actors from developed and
developing nations over how losses and damages should be addressed. According to
Mechler & Schinko (2016), although many developed nations agree on the need to help
vulnerable populations suffering from climate harms, many are also unwilling to consider
notions of liability. As such, key negotiation stances lean towards liability and
compensation for developing nations, and disaster risk management and insurance for
developed nation parties (Schinko et al., 2019). Developing countries consistently argue
that work on WIM ExCom’s third action area (‘enhancing action and support, including
finance, technology and capacity building’) is eclipsed by work on the first action area,
which concerns enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk
management approaches (Vanhala et al., 2021). Against this backdrop, Roberts & Pelling
(2018) emphasize the need for comprehensive risk management frameworks with
sustainable development at their core, addressing the root causes of vulnerability and
building resilience to limit future loss and damage to human societies. Per the
recommendation of Thomas et al. (2020) that more Loss and Damage research be framed
in the language of the UNFCCC, this category is designed around the UNFCCC framing
of Comprehensive Climate Risk Management (WIM ExCom, 2019). The WIM CCRM
compendium outlines four sub-categories including risk assessment, risk reduction, risk
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transfer and risk retention. In searching each policy for risk management content relevant
to Loss and Damage, I aim to determine how Chile’s strategies regarding climate risk
align with the four categories of Comprehensive Risk Management outlined in the
workplan of the WIM. The five identifiers in this category reflect those of the WIM
compendium and include a “general” identifier to capture content referencing risk
management generally.
2.3.4 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Although extreme or slow-onset climate events may be superficially responsible
for incurred losses and damages, much recent scholarship points to the necessity of
addressing the underlying factors that exacerbate their severity and predispose certain
people or groups to disproportionate harm (i.e., vulnerability, structural inequalities, etc.)
(Aleksandrova & Costella, 2021; Gach, 2019; Roberts & Pelling, 2018). The necessity of
addressing disproportionate vulnerability to climate change is stated often within reports
and other publications of the WIM (UNFCCC, 2020; WIM ExCom, 2017, 2019). This
broad focus on uneven vulnerability is refined within the Executive Committee’s rolling
five-year workplan, the cross-cutting considerations of which require that the body take
into account not only countries vulnerable to climate change, but also populations
vulnerable given their unique geographies, socioeconomic status, livelihoods, gender,
age, indigenous or minority status or disability; and the ecosystems on which they depend
(WIM ExCom, 2017).
A growing body of scholarship echoes this focus on vulnerabilities within the
WIM workplan, emphasizing the importance of social protection policies for addressing
disproportionate climate-related losses and damages (Aleksandrova & Costella, 2021).
Much of this academic literature specifically notes the relevance of sustainable
development to the advancement of Loss and Damage in both theory and practice
(Aleksandrova & Costella, 2021; Boda et al., 2020; Roberts & Pelling, 2018). Losses and
damages have been conceptualized by some, for example, as the global failure to
maintain a sustainable development (Boda et al., 2020), while others suggest that Loss
and Damage represents a “clarion call” for a revision of inequitable and unsustainable
development priorities and mechanisms (Roberts & Pelling, 2018, p.9). Boda et al.
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(2021) further suggest that specific approaches to sustainable development may help
inform Loss and Damage research. In particular, the “human development” approach,
which centers on the freedoms people have to achieve a certain level of well-being and
identifies the most vulnerable populations as priority targets for Loss and Damage
governance actions, represents a valuable perspective to inform strategies to address
losses and damages (Boda et al., 2021). The approach leverages a complex dashboard of
indicators to assess wellbeing, including but not limited to achievements in education and
health, economic performance, environmental quality and political freedom (Chiba et al.,
2018 in Boda et al., 2021), aligning closely with the priorities of the ExCom in regard to
addressing underlying vulnerabilities to climate change. Coupled with the focus of the
WIM on addressing harms to the world’s most vulnerable, the broad consideration of
human development actions outlined by Boda et al. (2021) provided the basis for this
social development category.
2.4 METHODS
Data for this analysis included five national-level climate laws and policies in
Chile (Table 2.2): National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP); Nationally
Determined Contribution (NDC); National Adaptation Plan (NAP); National Policy/Plan
for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR Policy/Plan); and the Draft Framework Climate Bill
(FWB) which was released for public comment in 2019 and is currently under debate by
the Chilean Congress.
Collectively, the selected policies in their untranslated (Spanish) forms totaled
826 pages in length and were obtained from the government of Chile, or the UNFCCC in
the case of the NDC. Of the selected policies, only the NDC was available in English. I
chose Google Translate to supplement my remedial Spanish for the purpose of
translation, converting the remaining four policy documents in this manner.
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Table 2.2: Titles and descriptions of national-level Chilean climate policies analyzed
Policy

Date

Description

National Climate
Change Action
Plan (NCCAP)

2017

The plan is aimed at the effective implementation of measures
that have been identified to adapt to climate change and to
reduce the vulnerability of the country

2020

The updated NDC reflects Chile’s contributions to addressing
climate change, this time with the addition of a “social pillar”
to the historical categories of mitigation and adaptation. This
NDC update lays out Chile’s path to becoming the first
developing nation to commit to carbon neutrality by 2050.

2014

The NAP is the "articulating instrument" of the Chilean public
policy on adaptation to Climate Change. It provides the
guidelines for adaptation and provides the operational structure
for the coordination and coherence of the actions across the
different sectors and levels of territorial administration.

Nationally
Determined
Contribution
(NDC)
National
Adaptation Plan
(NAP)

National Plan &
Policy for Disaster
Risk Reduction
(DRR)

Draft Framework
Climate Change
Bill (FWB)

2020

Forthcoming

The National Policy and its respective National Strategic Plan
2020-2030 constitute the guiding instruments in the country in
matters of Disaster Risk Management (DRM), defining
objectives, actions, goals, deadlines and involved national
actors, through which they will be designed and they will
execute the initiatives aimed at Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)
within the framework of sustainable development to which
Chile aspires.
The purpose of the bill is to create a legal framework that
assigns specific responsibilities for the implementation of
mitigation and adaptation measures to climate change. It seeks
to strengthen and give continuity to policies, plans, programs
and actions on climate change, with a long-term view which
transcends the government of the day.

The analysis process consisted of two stages: a keyword search followed by a
qualitative analysis of each national-level policy. The keyword search analysis,
conducted first, entailed a simple term-based search of all five documents, allowing me to
identify overall trends and frequency of search term occurrences. The qualitative analysis
combined inductive and deductive coding, allowing me to capture relevant search terms
not initially identified, as well as related policy content. Together, the two processes
provided a thorough understanding of how each framework category is represented in
Chilean policy.
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To determine the initial set of keywords for each identifier (Table 2.3), I reviewed
relevant UNFCCC and scholarly literature to identify a set of terms frequently associated
with each policy domain of the Loss and Damage framework. These terms provided the
initial basis for the keyword search, while the subsequent qualitative analysis provided an
opportunity to refine the keyword list, adding relevant terms as they occurred during a
thorough a detailed reading of each text. Terms identified inductively as part of the
qualitative analysis are bolded in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3: List of keyword search terms by framework category. Terms not bolded were identified
prior to analysis using UNFCCC documents and scholarly Loss and Damage literature. Terms
identified inductively during the qualitative analysis process are in bold font.

During the keyword search, I text-searched each policy document for the terms I
had selected based on UNFCCC documents and relevant academic literature. I examined
all term occurrences within each policy closely, reading each in context to determine its
relevance to its respective identifier and FW category. Many terms were necessarily
broad in nature or frequently used (i.e., "vulnerab-" under the social development
identifier or "assess-" under the risk assessment identifier). Some terms were additionally
present in multiple categories given the potential for dual meanings/uses. Therefore, a
close contextual reading ensured that each term counted was used in a manner that made
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it relevant to its identifier. I omitted terms used in ways unrelated to the Loss and
Damage context (i.e., “damage” in reference to automobile accidents), as well as those
occurring within the table of contents, section headers, and government ministry and
document titles, as these provided little to no context with which to assess the term’s
relevance. Search terms occurring on their own and within part of another term were
counted only as part of the larger term (i.e., “loss” occurring within “loss and damage”
was only counted under “loss and damage” and not under the separate term “loss”).
The qualitative analysis, which followed the keyword search, had both deductive
and inductive components. During this process, I read each policy document thoroughly,
deductively coding relevant text to each framework category and respective identifiers
using NVivo 11 to organize my workflow. This framework-guided analysis served as a
broad net to capture Loss and Damage content within each policy document. In addition,
I also coded inductively during this process, stopping at keywords and other occurrences
of framework-relevant policy content, evaluating the text and noting whether it contained
important terms not already captured under the framework categories. If additional terms
relevant framework arose during this qualitative process, I first revisited the relevant
UNFCCC documents and academic literature to decide whether that term was appropriate
and necessary to include within the search term list. If so, I added the term to the search
term list and captured it within the total term counts and frequencies. As an example,
"financial protection," although not a term not typically used in UNFCCC descriptions of
risk transfer/retention and therefore not included in my initial term list, is used to
collectively reference/encompass these strategies in Chilean policy. As such, I added it as
a search term and captured all relevant occurrences within the final counts/frequencies. In
this way, the combination of the keyword search and qualitative analysis comprised an
iterative process, allowing for a continual revision of the search terms and a robust
understanding of how each framework category is addressed across these five Chilean
policy documents.
After conducting the keyword search and qualitative analysis, I extracted coded
text from the database I set up using NVivo software and selected quoted text to better
interpret how each framework category is addressed in Chilean policy relative to the
global Loss and Damage agenda. I translated keyword occurrence frequencies of terms
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within each category into percentages relative to the total word count of the combined
documents for a relative comparison of the salience and prevalence of a topic within a
document.
2.5 RESULTS & DISCUSSION
From this analysis, evidence of all framework categories (albeit uneven across
identifiers) was present within the Chilean climate policy documents—with the exception
of event attribution. This distribution of content across the framework was surprising,
given the centrality of attribution to the global Loss and Damage agenda and surrounding
discourse. The results additionally reveal the notable recognition of several policy
domains linked to UNFCCC conceptualizations of Loss and Damage and the striking
omission of others. Overall, although the results highlight some Loss and Damagerelevant thinking among Chilean policymakers, the evidence also suggests some
conceptual divergences from the global agenda. As a result, it seems that the existing
similarities to the global agenda may at present not constitute a national Loss and
Damage mechanism explicitly identified or not.
A breakdown of results in relative frequencies of search terms for each framework
category follows below (See Table 2.4). In the discussion of each category, I provide
comments on potential synergies between Chile’s national climate policies and the global
agenda that may prove useful as Chile strives to address the impacts of climate change
occurring within its own borders.
2.5.1 EVENT ATTRIBUTION
References to attribution in the five analyzed policy documents are extremely
sparse. Explicit references to event attribution studies all focus on past investigations of
the Megadrought, which linked approximately 25% of continued drought severity to
anthropogenic forcing (Garreaud et al., 2020). Given the negligible representation of this
category relative to others within the framework, the centrality of attribution to the global
Loss and Damage agenda does not appear to be reflected within the Chilean policies
analyzed. This lack of content may simply indicate that few studies have pursued
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attribution of climatic events in Chile to date, however it also brings the relevance of this
Loss and Damage policy domain for Chile and other national actors into question.

Table 2.4: Relative frequency of search terms by framework category

It is important to consider that Chile may stand to gain very little from focusing
attention on attribution within its national climate policies Lahsen et al. (2020) suggest
that greater attention to the politics of place is needed before assuming that centering
climate change discourse on attribution is the most strategic means of achieving national
goals of climate action and disaster preparedness. The authors emphasize the importance
of contextual understanding when evaluating framing choices regarding disasters and
climate change, noting that it cannot necessarily be assumed that knowledge or
conviction regarding the reality of climate change warrants emphasis on its role in
disasters, even where attribution studies might find such a role (Lahsen et al., 2020).
What benefits do the nation and its people gain from the knowledge that a climatic event
is attributable? Losses and damages resulting from climatic events, like those
undoubtedly resulting from the Megadrought, will continue to occur whether Chile’s
policymakers emphasize attribution in policy or not. The nation’s policymakers do not
appear to be grappling with whom to blame for losses and damages, as is the trend in
global Loss and Damage discourse. Instead, the country, as with most countries, will
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need to simply respond, and attempt to avoid future losses to the greatest extent possible.
Further exploration of the contextual factors underlying Chile’s approach to attribution, if
desired, might include Congressional records, hearings, and discussions debating disaster
response to extreme and slow-onset climatic events, as well as Ministry policies on
disaster responses to specific kinds of events.
Finally, an emphasis on attribution in policy might counterintuitively disguise the
root causes of loss and damage, focusing attention on global politics and climate
processes while underlying vulnerabilities within Chile’s borders continue predisposing
portions of the country’s population to disproportionate harm. Lahsen & Ribot (2022)
describe the calculus of leveraging attribution as a moral and strategic challenge for
national actors, pointing out that attribution-centric framing of climate extremes
can “erase from view—and, thus, from policy agendas—the very socio-economic and
political factors that most centrally cause vulnerability and suffering in weather extremes
and disasters” (Lahsen & Ribot, 2022, p.1). Significant space is dedicated within these
five policies to recognition of inequities and vulnerabilities that predispose certain
populations in Chile to climate-related harm. Given this heavy focus on vulnerabilities to
climate change and associated risk management efforts (discussed below), the national
priorities regarding framing of climatic events may be oriented away from attribution in
strategic favor of other, more immediately relevant focus areas.
In the future, it is possible that attribution will play a more significant role in
Chile’s national climate strategies than it does at present. As climatic events and related
impacts linked to anthropogenic forcing continue to intensify, national policymakers may
be increasingly incentivized to seek compensation for losses and damages from sources
like multinational corporations or foreign governments. For the moment, however, it
appears that the country of Chile and its policymakers are grappling with questions of
how best to endure the worst effects of climate change and prepare the country and its
people for the future. The finding in this category underscores the suggestion of Lahsen
et al. (2020) that a deeper examination of attribution’s centrality to global policy
processes (i.e., the WIM) and is needed. Global-level assumptions of attribution’s
universal relevance for individual nations, the authors suggest, is ripe for revision.
Attribution may ultimately have real relevance only for answering questions of “who
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pays?,” which, although important at the global scale, has less relevance for the climate
strategies of individual nations.
2.5.2 LOSSES AND DAMAGES
“Losses and damages” was the most-referenced framework category by a slim
margin. Considering the category’s identifiers, roughly half of the search terms occurred
within the general losses and damages identifier. Content in this identifier provides some
interesting insights into how climate-related harms are conceptualized in Chilean policy
and how that conceptualization relates to the global Loss and Damage discourse. Policy
content related to NELDs was the second most common identifier, followed by slowonset events.
2.5.2.1 Losses and damages (general)
Within this identifier are three notable themes regarding Chilean policymakers’
conceptualizations of climate-related harms. The first of these is the disproportionality of
climate change impacts, which reflects a central component of the global Loss and
Damage agenda. The WIM’s focus on disproportionate climate impacts on developing
nations is reflected in the NAP, which states that:
[g]lobal warming is already underway and adaptation strategies are urgently
required, especially for developing countries, which are already
disproportionately feeling the effects, and putting their economic progress and
food security at risk (Gobierno de Chile, 2014, p.12).
In addition to the recognition of national disproportionality, the disproportionality of
climate impacts on local communities and municipalities is also noted:
[l]ocal communities and municipalities… will suffer the direct impacts of
climate change, and their ability to respond to such impacts is essential to
reducing the damage and losses caused by extreme events (Gobierno de Chile,
2020a, p.18).
A second theme present within the Chilean policies’ discussion of climate harms
is the potential irreversibility of climate impacts, which represents one of the crosscutting considerations of the WIM’s five-year workplan. According to the NCCAP:
[m]ore and more voices are raised to warn about Climate Change, the greatest
challenge facing humanity: because of its devastating effects, because of its
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planetary implications, and because we are talking about damage, mostly
irreversible (Gobierno de Chile, 2017, p.8).
Within global Loss and Damage discourse, “loss” is typically conceptualized as
permanent or irreversible, while “damage” is understood to be reparable (Schinko et al.,
2019). Given the above excerpt from the NCCAP, this distinction may not be perfectly
reflected within Chilean policy, however recognition of the irreversibility of some
climate impacts represents an alignment with the conceptualization of loss and damage
under the WIM.
Finally, there is a notable absence of policy content in which climate-related
harms are conceptualized as ‘beyond adaptation.’ This suggests limited recognition by
Chilean policymakers that the impacts of climate change are currently exceeding (or will
exceed in the future) the nation’s capacity to adapt to them. This is a highly salient
finding, as losses and damages are conceptualized under the UNFCCC specifically as the
residual harms that occur once adaptation capacities prove insufficient (James et al.,
2014). The preamble of the WIM itself acknowledges that climate-related loss and
damage “includes, and in some cases involves more than, that which can be reduced by
adaptation” (UNFCCC, 2014, p.6). Given the prolonged Megadrought and other climate
extremes affecting the country, Chile is undoubtedly experiencing climate changeattributable losses and damages, making the relative absence of “beyond adaptation”
discussion both notable and concerning. The DRR Plan acknowledges, for example, the
increased frequency and intensity of extreme climatic events in Chile (including the
Megadrought), which it notes resulted in 15 Decrees of Water Scarcity from the General
Water Directorate, affecting 129 communes across the country in 2019 (Gobierno de
Chile, 2020b). This highly specific recognition of harms resulting from climate change,
paired with the absence of discussions of impacts beyond adaptation, suggests that
Chilean policymakers diverge significantly from the UNFCCC perspective on this matter,
potentially aligning more closely with the last of the typologies suggested by Boyd et al.
(2017), in which mitigation and adaptation are considered sufficient for addressing
climate-related losses and damages. One excerpt from the NCCAP may affirm this:
[l]eft unchecked, climate change will increase the likelihood of serious,
widespread and irreversible impacts on people and ecosystems. However, there
are options for adaptation to climate change and with rigorous mitigation
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activities, it is possible to ensure that the impacts of climate change remain at a
controllable level, creating a clearer and more sustainable future (Gobierno de
Chile, 2017, p.13).
The phrase “remain at a controllable level” appears to suggest, concerningly, that
adaptation and mitigation are sufficient to keep climate impacts within some sort of status
quo, and also that Chile’s policymakers believe they are still within the range of
“control,” which, given the global nature of the climate crisis, is tenuously true.
2.5.2.2 Non-economic loss and damage
Search terms captured within the NELD identifier account for less than a quarter
all references within the losses and damages category, however this result suggests a
recognition by Chilean policymakers of climate impacts that extend beyond the
monetarily quantifiable. Although terms like “non-economic” and “intangible” are never
employed, climate-related impacts are referenced which fall into all three of the WIM
ExCom’s designated areas of NELD: individual, societal, and environmental (UNFCCC,
2020). For example, the NAP suggests that:
[s]piritual and material fulfillment, which ultimately means the well-being of
the population, can be affected by the impacts of climate change, either by
reducing the availability or quality of water or food, in the safety of people, in
employment, in the goods and services provided by ecosystems, or the negative
effects on the health of the population (Gobierno de Chile, 2014, p.31).
This excerpt alone acknowledges potential climate-related impacts to individuals
(reduced employment, food/water quality), society (health of the population), and
environment (ecosystem services). The NCCAP additionally suggests that increases in
the intensity of heat waves and extreme weather events will impact the mental health of
the population (Gobierno de Chile, 2017), while the NDC outlines the importance of
forest ecosystems to the identities and emotional balance of indigenous groups within the
country—specifically noting the potential disruption of those values by climate change
(Gobierno de Chile, 2020a).
In the NCCAP quote above, the proposed response centers on adaptation. the
NAP asserts that the State’s role in protecting the population’s well-being is to:
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prepare the country to adapt to climate change, so as not to compromise the
current well-being and that of future generations… promot[ing],
coordinat[ing], supervis[ing] and execut[ing] activities that increase the
adaptive capacity of sectors exposed to climate change (Gobierno de Chile,
2014, p.31).
The same holds true across all five policies: adaptation and risk management are the
primary proposed strategies of Chilean policymakers for addressing non-economic
harms. For example, addressing the potential increase in climate-related human mobility
is discussed by the NDC within the context of required increases in adaptive capacity
(Gobierno de Chile, 2014). In the same vein, addressing the threats posed to cultural
heritage by disasters (inclusive of climate-related disasters) is suggested by the DRR Plan
to fall within the realm of risk assessment and reduction (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b). This
framing of non-economic harms as addressable via adaptation and risk management
appears to be very future-focused, with losses seemingly conceptualized as preventable
harms to come; not as impacts likely occurring today.
Finally, although non-economic harms are recognized in the policy texts, there are
also inconsistencies regarding how such harms are discussed relative to concepts of
quantification. For example, the DRR policy differentiates non-economic (social) harms
from more typically economic ones:
The possibility of frequently suffering significant damages and losses both in
terms of human lives, as well as economic and financial ones, is one of the
greatest challenges facing the country (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b, p.15).
On the other hand, the NCCAP appears to combine social and economic losses under
GDP for purposes of quantification:
[it] is estimated that in Chile the environmental, social and economic losses in
the country due to [climate change] could become significant, reaching 1.1% of
GDP per year by the year 2100 (Gobierno de Chile, 2017, p.16).
This apparent discrepancy suggests that, although Chile acknowledges the occurrence of
non-economic harms, the distinction between these and more monetarily quantifiable
impacts is not yet common in Chilean climate change discourse. The apparent lack of
distinction between economic and non-economic harms has implications for potential
policy responses and their impact in turn on the Chilean population. Tschakert et al.
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(2019) summarize these implications clearly, observing that continued prioritization of
quantifiable harms in policy (as has been the historical trend) subverts the importance of
non-economic ones, the loss of which, the authors note, are keenly felt and often highly
impactful to individuals.
Although the policy content captured in this identifier omits some terms typically
applied in UNFCCC discussions of NELD (“non-economic” and “intangible,” for
example), non-economic climate harms are nonetheless acknowledged—a surprising
finding, particularly given Chile’s political economic history. Serdeczny et al. (2018)
note that NELDs often go unrecognized in national policy due to governance contexts
historically dominated by liberal economic, market-based approaches to climate change.
Given that Chile’s political economy in the wake of the Pinochet dictatorship has been
largely driven towards market-based environmental policies (Latta & Aguayo, 2012), the
recognition of non-economic climate impacts within Chilean policy is striking. But
although non-economic harms are recognized, those harms appear largely conceptualized
as problems for the future to be addressed through adaptation or risk reduction, with the
additional challenge of inconsistency regarding policymakers’ approach to quantification
of such harms.
2.5.2.3 Slow-onset events
In its guide to Loss and Damage, the WIM ExCom recognizes slow-onset events
as including desertification, loss of biodiversity, land and forest degradation, glacial
retreat, ocean acidification, sea level rise, ocean acidification, soil salinization and rising
temperatures (UNFCCC, 2020). Although the term “slow-onset” never appears within
any of the Chilean policy documents analyzed, seven of the eight slow-onset event types
recognized by the WIM ExCom are referenced at least once, with salinization being the
exception. This recognition of 7/8 of the WIM’s identified slow-onset event types may be
due to the nation’s geographic context. Chile has an immense latitudinal span and
encompasses a wide diversity of ecozones, including a 4,000-mile coastline. As a result,
the slow-onset climatic events to which the country is exposed may be much greater than
other nations.
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2.5.3 COMPREHENSIVE RISK MANAGEMENT
The comprehensive risk management category was second in term frequency only
to the losses and damages category. Comprehensive risk management strategies as
conceptualized within the WIM are integral to minimizing, averting and addressing losses
and damages. Taken alone, individual strategies such as risk transfer tools are insufficient
for addressing the impacts of climate change, which leads to the WIM’s emphasis on a
holistic approach to risk management (Kehinde, 2014; WIM ExCom, 2019), inclusive of
all the elements included in this category as identifiers. Policy content captured within
this category, which align with the 2nd action area of the WIM ExCom, was spread
largely across the general, risk assessment, and risk reduction identifiers, with very low
term occurrence for risk transfer or retention.
2.5.3.1 Risk Assessment
The search terms within the risk assessment identifier occurred somewhat less
frequently than those in the general risk management or risk reduction identifiers but are
nonetheless well-represented. Risk assessment in the five policies analyzed manifests
largely as understanding risks and vulnerabilities via systematic analysis processes,
mapping, etc. The NCCAP highlights the need, for example, to:
characterize the vulnerabilities of the country’s communes, their climate
contexts, and their adaptation options in order to identify areas of heightened
risk to extreme climatic events (Gobierno de Chile, 2017, p.113).
Although risk assessment content is well-represented, the WIM Compendium on
CRM provides a potential explanation for its slightly lower representation relative to risk
reduction despite the necessity of assessment for reduction: that risk assessment efforts
like hazard and vulnerability mapping are time and resource intensive which, in a country
as large and socially/geographically diverse as Chile, may present a significant hurdle to
be overcome. The discrepancy between the two, as discussed below, may also be due
simply to the global prevalence in risk management discourse of the Sendai Framework
for Disaster Risk Reduction3, an agreement which Chile both helped formulate and
subsequently adopted (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b). Additionally, it is possible that more
3

https://www.undrr.org/implementing-sendai-framework/what-sendai-framework
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abundant, detailed content relative to risk assessment might be found elsewhere, such as
in Chile’s sectoral adaptation plans (not considered in this analysis) given their dedicated
focus on climate preparedness for specific areas of national concern relative to climate
change.
2.5.3.2 Risk Reduction
As suggested by this identifier’s centrality to one of the policies analyzed, Chile’s
approach to climate risk management emphasizes risk reduction quite heavily. The
national DRR Plan outlines the axes of the country’s risk reduction strategy, which
include understanding disaster risk, strengthening risk governance, planning and
investing in risk reduction for resilience, providing an effective disaster response, and
promoting sustainable recovery from such events (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b). Strategies
for risk reduction as discussed within the national policies range from generating training
programs to bolster DRR awareness to improving early warning, communication and
evacuation systems (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b). These stated objectives roughly align
with those of risk reduction as described under the WIM CRM Compendium, which
defines risk reduction as consisting of systematic efforts to analyze and manage the
causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened
vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and
improved preparedness for adverse events (WIM ExCom, 2019). Regarding the slightly
lopsided representation of terms within the risk assessment and reduction identifiers, it is
frequently noted across many of the policies analyzed that Chile is both a signatory to the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and played a central role in the
framework’s development. As such, and given that risk reduction is a globally accepted,
relatively non-contentious approach to minimizing damage from climate change and
related events, it is not ultimately surprising that risk reduction is emphasized to a degree
that somewhat overshadows related risk assessment strategies.
2.5.3.3 Risk Transfer & Retention
Search term occurrences within these two identifiers (combined here as they are
frequently referenced in tandem) are surprisingly sparse, representing a small fraction of

40

those captured within the risk management category. As suggested in the WIM
Compendium on CRM, risk transfer and retention are a key component of addressing
climate-related losses and damages by absorbing impacts that result from frequent low
intensity events and shifting the burden of financial consequences from more significant
events (like prolonged drought or severe storms) which could be disastrous for the
country (WIM ExCom, 2019). Kehinde (2014) notes that often, developing countries that
experience climate-related loss and damage must divert funds from their national budget
or obtain loans and donations from the international community. These strategies are not
always timely or adequate, however, and insurance and other risk transfer/retention
options present an avenue for reducing losses and damages by prompting payouts that
help alleviate human suffering. Within Chilean policy, these strategies are frequently
referred to as “financial protection,” defined as:
…the optimal combination of mechanisms or financial instruments for the
retention and transfer of risk to be able to access timely economic resources…
which improves the capacity to respond to the occurrence of disasters (minor
events and recurrent and large low recurrence disasters) and protects the fiscal
balance of the State (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b, p.137).
The details of financial protection are explored very minimally, however, with related
measures mentioned only briefly under one of the DRR Plan’s strategic objectives.
Measures under this objective include:
[preparing proposals] for evaluating the application, scope, coverage and
impact of… mechanisms and instruments for financial protection against
disaster risk (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b)
Additionally, a single funding mechanism is specifically noted (but not elaborated upon)
within the appendices of DRR Plan, which may constitute a mechanism for risk retention:
Law No. 20,444…creates the National Reconstruction Fund and establishes tax
incentive mechanisms for donations made in the event of a catastrophe
(Gobierno de Chile, 2020b, p.165).
The quotations above are accompanied by minimal context, making it difficult to
understand the specifics or relevance of the proposed financial protection instruments or
the National Reconstruction Fund. How will funds from these mechanisms be
used/distributed? To what degree are (or will they be) relevant to alleviating human
suffering in the wake of climatic events? These excerpts also suggest that examination of
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additional sources may be necessary for a comprehensive understanding of Chile’s risk
transfer and retention strategies for climate-related events. These strategies may be better
represented and/or expanded upon in specific disaster or emergency response policies, or
within legal frameworks related to disaster response.
Given Chile’s national vulnerability to climatic events (Gobierno de Chile,
2020a), the limited representation of risk transfer and retention strategies within the five
national policies analyzed is concerning. Kehinde (2014) notes that limited recognition or
pursuit of risk transfer strategies can also be due to lack of data on risk and exposure,
particularly in areas where hazard and vulnerability mapping is difficult, as this
knowledge foundation is central to informing risk transfer strategies. As mentioned
previously, given Chile’s large latitudinal span and the wide array of climate zones within
its national territory, the difficulty of hazard mapping may indeed present a formidable
challenge. Importantly however, as mentioned above, these strategies may be better
represented and/or expanded upon in documents other than national climate policies.
Ultimately, the uneven distribution of risk management content may offer
additional insight into how climate-related harms are conceptualized among Chilean
policymakers. Like the absence of thinking “beyond adaptation” discussed above, the
overwhelming focus here on risk assessment and reduction suggests that climate-related
harms are approached primarily as future eventualities to be planned for. The relative
absence of risk transfer and retention, which represent measures to address harms that
exceed what is planned for or can be coped with, suggests again that harms exceeding
adaptation, risk assessment, and risk reduction capabilities are approached with less
urgency and immediacy. This finding reinforces the understanding that Chile’s national
climate change strategies are highly future-oriented, with little consideration of
unavoidable impacts that are already occurring—if not occurring already.
2.5.4 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Overall, the frequency of results in the social development category was similar to
that of the risk management category. The results here reflect the presence, albeit
unevenly represented across identifiers, of thinking linked to the UNFCCC and WIM
objectives of reducing underlying vulnerabilities that exacerbate the likelihood of
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climate-related harms. This potential alignment of priorities between the WIM and the
Chilean policies analyzed is underscored by the inclusion of a “social pillar” in the
updated NDC, which calls for the need to maximize synergies between Chile’s climate
commitments and the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals4. This social pillar
emphasizes the inherent relationship between climate change, the actions taken to address
its effects, and the provision of equitable access to the benefits of sustainable
development (Gobierno de Chile, 2020a). Importantly, the DRR Plan also lists “human
development” as one of its “cross-sectional approaches,” stating the policy’s intended
alignment with the Agenda 2030 commitment to “ensure that no one is left behind”
(Gobierno de Chile, 2020b, p.27). The policy subsequently invokes the role of the State
to:
be at the service of the human person and… promote the common good, for
which it must contribute to creating the social conditions that allow each and
every one of the members of the national community their greatest possible
spiritual and material fulfillment (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b, p.27)
A breakdown of findings by identifier for this category is provided below.
2.5.4.1 Education
Although education is the second-most frequent identifier, all content captured
refers to the need for climate- or risk-specific education, rather than access to education
more generally. For example, the NAP sets a target to:
develop formal and informal climate change environmental education
processes, to empower the citizenship for climate action (Gobierno de Chile,
2014, p.38)
Under the human development approach in Boda et al. (2021), education (or lack
thereof) is framed as an underlying contributor to disproportionate climate vulnerability
and a general inability of people to achieve well-being. This framing is generally absent
from the five Chilean policies analyzed, which instead frame education as a tool for
disseminating climate information. Although valuable, this differs from the framing of
education as central to the reduction of vulnerability referenced in the WIM workplan.

4

https://sdgs.un.org/goals

43

2.5.4.2 Gender Equity
Concepts of gender and gender equity are frequently referenced across all five
policies, with clearly stated recognition of differential vulnerabilities based on gender and
related power dynamics. The DRR Plan, for example, identifies gender among its crosssectional approaches, aiming to:
…tak[e] into account…the differences between women and men in any activity
or field given in a policy. …[This] involves the recognition of the existence of a
set of power relations that define the division of labor and the norms, values
and ideologies about masculinity and femininity that are associated with said
division (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b, p.29).
This focus on uneven vulnerability based on gender extends frequently to climate
vulnerability specifically, as exemplified in the NCCAP:
[in] this Plan, special attention has been given to obtaining information on
vulnerability and risk, disaggregated by sex, considering that women and men
may be differently affected or affected by climate change (Gobierno de Chile,
2017, p.40)
This explicit focus on gender discrepancies in climate vulnerability aligns closely with
the stated priorities of the WIM ExCom under the five-year workplan.
2.5.4.3 Health
The health identifier is the third-most frequently referenced within the social
development category. The search terms captured reference a variety of impacts on
human health and well-being that climate change is expected to exacerbate. The FWB,
for example, defines “adverse effects of climate change” as:
[c]hanges in the environment, caused by climate change, that have significant
harmful consequences on the composition, resilience or productivity of
ecosystems, on human health and well-being, or in socioeconomic system
(Gobierno de Chile, 2019, p.21).
The NAP notes that:
[t]he relationship between the phenomenon of climate change and the effects
on human health is extremely complex (Gobierno de Chile, 2014, p.25).
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acknowledging that direct impacts to human health are possible, as are indirect effects
resulting from compromised systems which provide health support such as water and
food. The NCCAP suggests that these impacts extend, particularly in the cases of heat
waves and extreme weather events, to “…direct impacts on the physical and mental
health of the population" (Gobierno de Chile, 2014, p.17).
2.5.4.4 Poverty Reduction
Search term occurrences in the poverty reduction identifier were sparse, however
the link between poverty and vulnerability to climate change is firmly established in the
policies analyzed. The NAP notes that:
[i]ncreased pressure on health services and human settlements is… expected,
especially among the poorest segments of society, who are often at risk and least able to
cope with the consequences of extreme weather events… and other impacts of climate
change (Gobierno de Chile, 2014, p.30)

while the NDC identifies poverty as a key focus within its intended 2025 climate change
risk assessment for vulnerable groups. In this sense, although terms within this identifier
are infrequently referenced, an alignment with the WIM’s framing of poverty as an
underlying driver of climate vulnerability is apparent.
2.5.4.5 Vulnerability
Within the social development category, vulnerability is the most referenced
identifier, accounting for nearly half of the total search terms captured in the entire
category. Vulnerability is broadly defined in Chilean policy regarding who is considered
vulnerable:
those groups most vulnerable to risk situations [include] women, children and
adolescents, the elderly, people with disabilities or dependence in some area,
migrants, refugees, among others, and also of those who live in more exposed
territories (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b, p.31).
This discussion of who is vulnerable appears to be informed by a strong focus on
underlying drivers of that vulnerability. For example, the DRR Plan recognizes the
constructed nature of disasters, stating that:
[d]isasters are not natural but rather the crystallization of the vulnerabilities of
a community, where poverty and marginality become determining factors in the
configuration of disaster risk (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b, p.13).
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Chilean policymakers appear to recognize the progressive nature of this stance on
vulnerability, stating in the DRR Plan that:
there are still few countries that have focused their efforts and resources on
understanding and reducing the predetermining conditions that enhance the
occurrence of a disaster, the so-called underlying risk factors. Chile is a pioneer
in this scope (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b, p.14).
Frequent assertions of the need to prioritize the nation’s most vulnerable when
identifying and implementing climate actions underscores this dedication:
[this plan will] prioritize those adaptation measures aimed at the most
vulnerable groups and the poorest sectors of the population, where the effects of
climate change could have a greater impact (Gobierno de Chile, 2014, p.52).
Chile’s focus on addressing the vulnerabilities that underly climate harms
distinctly reflects the focus on disproportionality that is central to the global Loss and
Damage agenda, especially in its focus on poverty and gender, which are explicitly note
in the WIM workplan (WIM ExCom, 2017). Importantly, Chile’s position on
vulnerability aligns as well with assertions from the academic literature that “to
minimize, avert, and address L&D, climate change risk and adaptation discussions must
include a focus on addressing root causes of vulnerability” (Boyd et al., 2021).
2.5.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR LOSS AND DAMAGE POLICY IN CHILE AND BEYOND
In the context of the emergent “national turn” within Loss and Damage research
and policy (Calliari & Vanhala, 2022), this study provides an illustrative exploration of
potential Loss and Damage mechanisms in a national context where no explicit
mechanism currently exists. The research questions of this study aimed to determine how
Chile currently addresses losses and damages, and specifically whether Loss and Damage
as conceptualized by the global agenda is currently embedded in national-level Chilean
climate policy; expressly identified as such or not. To this question, the answer appears to
be largely “no,” but not without exceptions.
Importantly, there appears to be a fundamental misalignment between Chilean
climate policy and the global Loss and Damage agenda with one particularly salient point
of divergence. That is, Chilean policymakers do not appear to be engaging with the
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concept of inevitable loss. For example, the framing of losses and damages as “beyond
adaptation” is entirely absent; policymakers appear to anticipate mitigation and
adaptation strategies being largely capable of countering the future impacts of climate
change, with no substantive consideration of how residual impacts might be addressed.
As another example, risk assessment and risk reduction (which largely encompass
strategies to assess vulnerabilities and prevent losses and damages before they happen)
are well-represented, however risk transfer and retention (which provide avenues for
obtaining funding to address losses and damages once they’ve already occurred) are
considerably less so.
Additionally, it appears that event attribution, which is of central importance to
global Loss and Damage discourse, is likely less relevant at the national level.
Importantly, event attribution (and the associated question of who should pay for losses
and damages) may not be of significant concern for individual countries that are instead
focused simply on coping with the impacts of climate change on their populations. In
fact, it is possible that a concerted emphasis on attribution may unintentionally obscure
the root causes of disproportionate climate vulnerability by placing blame for climaterelated harms elsewhere. This finding may hold true for other climate-impacted nations
and not just for Chile.
Despite the misalignment noted above, certain elements of the global Loss and
Damage agenda are undeniably present in Chilean policy. Under the NELD identifier, for
example, Chile explicitly recognizes the potential of climate change to impact the mental
and spiritual well-being of the Chilean population. Under social development, Chile
recognizes structural inequities such as gendered power dynamics and poverty that
underly disproportionate climate vulnerabilities. The caveat to these recognitions is that,
in policy content directed toward addressing them, the misalignment noted above arises,
with these elements treated as primarily future problems which can be avoided through
adaptation or risk reduction and not current challenges associated with loss, damage, and
the social-ecological impacts thereof. Although these strategies are essential components
of a national response to climate change, adaptation or risk assessment/reduction alone,
particularly in a climate-vulnerable country like Chile, falls short of answering a critical
question: what happens if (and likely when) these strategies fall short?
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2.5.5.1 The Future of National Mechanisms
What are the implications of these findings, both for Chile and for national Loss
and Damage mechanisms globally? As an example, in the case of Chile, the DRR plan
describes the Megadrought-induced water scarcity decrees issued across 129 Chilean
municipalities in 2019 (Gobierno de Chile, 2020b). Losses and damages incurred from
the this and other climatic events will continue to increase in frequency and magnitude
given current climate projections—regardless of whether policymakers are grappling
with the reality of unavoidable losses to come. I suggest early in this paper that Chile
appears to have both the motivation and the means to address loss and damage in its
climate policies. Upon completion of this analysis, although the means do appear to exist
(in the form of new climate policies and high national energy around climate action) the
motivation of policymakers may have yet to reach a critical threshold regarding
addressing losses and damages. This may shift in coming years, particularly given the
current recognition of looming climate harms in Chile’s existing policies. Chile is
entering a potentially transformative political moment, with constitutional reform on the
horizon and a young, progressive candidate recently elected to the presidency. Although
implementing national strategies to address Loss and Damage is a process that
necessarily varies by country and represents a significant challenge in both financial and
political terms, Chile appears well-positioned to do so; however, the country’s
policymakers must commit to taking the next step.
Concerning the global viability of national-level Loss and Damage policies, my
findings suggest that it is critical that a country both recognizes the potential for losses
and damages and is motivated to respond to those losses and damages beyond simply
scaling up its adaptation and mitigation efforts. Returning to the discussion of motivation
among Chilean policymakers and drawing from Calliari & Vanhala (2022), the drive to
supplement mitigation and adaptation will depend on numerous factors within individual
national contexts. One contextual factor relevant to motivation is likely the national
geographic and climatic context itself. These contexts in Chile, for example, are radically
different from those of a low-lying nation imminently threatened by sea level rise. Chile’s
climate crisis, while real and pressing currently, lacks the specific existential threat posed
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by total loss of national territory to inundation, which partially underlies the
disproportionate national-level action on Loss and Damage among low-lying and island
nations. Another relevant contextual factor is economic, concerning the much-debated
question: “where will the money for Loss and Damage come from?” To this question,
nations with a history of holding private industry within their borders accountable might
have an easier answer, and therefore a higher degree of motivation for pursuing national
Loss and Damage strategies. Given Chile’s long history of deference to industry in favor
of export-based profit; this motivator likely holds little power in the country currently.
Considering the above, global policymakers affiliated with the WIM and the UNFCCC
will need to consider the many possible factors that render nations around the world more
or less driven to expand their climate strategies to address inevitable losses and damages.
As a final note, the viability of national Loss and Damage mechanisms, given the
findings here, does not appear to hinge on the establishment of event attribution. This
policy domain, which has gained traction at the international level given its centrality to
assigning responsibility and compensation for losses and damages, appears to be
considerably less relevant for individual nations in their approaches to climate-related
harms.
Tschakert et al. (2019), in their global compilation of case studies on noneconomic loss and damage, illustrate the vast array of climate-related harms currently
spanning every inhabited continent. This is a prescient warning and underscores the
importance of continued research on national responses to loss and damage. It is
increasingly clear that national responses to loss and damage, given highly varied
national contexts and motivations, cannot be expected to follow a standardized globallevel template. Therefore, an urgent challenge facing global policymakers lies in
fostering better articulation of the global Loss and Damage agenda with national actors
across the full range of national contexts; facilitating these necessarily varied responses
as countries around the world grapple with the inevitability of harms to come.
2.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter provides an illustrative exploration of how losses and damages from
climate change are addressed in Chilean national-level climate policies, and whether

49

elements of the global Loss and Damage agenda are reflected therein. I conducted an
iterative, two-stage policy analysis on five Chilean national-level climate policies,
consisting of a keyword search and a deductive/inductive qualitative analysis. This
analysis was guided by a theoretical framework designed around four central policy
domains of the global Loss and Damage agenda (event attribution, losses and damages,
comprehensive risk management, and social development) and was supported by both
UNFCCC and scholarly literature. I found evidence of three out of four framework
categories within the five policies, with the notable exception of event attribution,
suggesting that this aspect of the global agenda may have limited relevance at the
national level. I additionally find that although key policy areas relevant to the global
agenda (NELD, for example) are recognized in Chilean policy, there is an apparent lack
of engagement among policymakers with the concept of inevitable loss. Many potential
harms, although clearly acknowledged, appear largely considered as future occurrences to
be addressed and prevented through adaptation and risk reduction, rather than potentially
inevitable harms which will require additional strategies to address. As such, although
elements of the global Loss and Damage agenda are acknowledged in Chilean policy, I
suggest that they do not amount at present to an analogue for the global agenda.
These findings are directly relevant for both the country of Chile and for globallevel progress on supporting national Loss and Damage mechanisms. It appears to be
critical that a country both recognizes the potential for losses and damages and is
motivated to supplement its response to those losses and damages beyond simply scaling
up its adaptation and mitigation efforts. Motivation will likely vary greatly across
national climatic, economic, and political contexts, posing an urgent challenge for global
policymakers seeking synergies between national and international strategies for
addressing losses and damages. The misalignment of Chilean climate policies with the
global Loss and Damage agenda underscores the fallacy of expecting a single
international policy agenda to prove relevant for nations across a world of contexts.
Considering the emerging “national turn” in Loss and Damage policy (Calliari &
Vanhala, 2022) and given the documented proliferation of climate-related harms around
the world (Tschakert et al., 2019), it is readily apparent that loss and damage presents a
current and accelerating issue of immense importance to address. As such, this and other
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studies examining national-level Loss and Damage strategies will be essential to
informing how global-level efforts can provide relevant guidance and support for nations
grappling with losses and damages around the world.
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3. LOSS AND DAMAGE IN EASTERN MONTANA
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in climate science have prompted stark warnings about the
extensive impacts to human and ecological systems that will result from anthropogenic
climate change, many of which are already manifesting globally (McNamara & Jackson,
2019; Pearson et al., 2021; Tschakert et al., 2019 in Henrique et al., 2022). Climaterelated harms that exceed existing capacities for mitigation and adaptation fall within the
purview of Loss and Damage, a policy agenda under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that works to address such harms,
acknowledging that they fall most heavily on the poor and marginalized within societies
(Tschakert et al., 2017). Within both policy and academic research, there has been a
growing attention to Loss and Damage in recent years, however many questions remain
regarding one of the policy agenda’s key focal areas: non-economic loss and damage
(NELD). NELDs are harms that defy quantification and are therefore difficult to address
in policy, such as loss of social cohesion, identity, or cultural heritage (Serdeczny et al.,
2016). Research has also begun emerging on the phenomenon of psychological impacts
such as grief and anxiety resulting from climate change (Cunsolo et al., 2020), which
represent a new and poorly understood form of NELD. Although the importance of
NELD is of high concern for the UNFCCC, empirical information on these forms of loss
and damage is lacking, which effectively hinders the implementation of informed,
effective policy actions to address them (Scown et al., 2022; Thomas et al., 2020).
Additionally, although much of the historic focus of Loss and Damage scholarship, (and
therefore NELDs) has been on developing nations, recent research demonstrating the
global distribution of NELDs suggests that additional studies across both developed and
developing contexts will be useful in clarifying the collective understanding of these
harms.
Bridging the knowledge gap concerning how NELDs manifest in various contexts
requires additional empirical research, which is necessary to inform policy responses to
non-economic harms. To contribute to bridging this gap, we investigate experiences with
extreme climatic events among Montana ranchers and farmers east of the Rocky
Mountains. The state of Montana, located in the northwestern United States, is
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particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change considering the reliance of many
of the state’s residents, and their livelihoods, on agriculture (Whitlock et al., 2017).
Climate change is projected to bring rapidly warming temperatures and increasing
precipitation variability to Montana, which combined may present a significant challenge
to farmers and ranchers dependent on specific climatic conditions for their livelihoods
(Whitlock et al., 2017). The summer of 2021 provided insight into the grim reality of
these projections when a record-breaking heatwave swept the Pacific Northwest, bringing
temperatures that shattered previous records by as much as 6º C (Overland, 2021). The
successful attribution of this extreme event’s severity to anthropogenic forcing by Philip
et al. (2021) suggests that climate-related losses and damages, including NELDs, were
likely sustained by ranchers and farmers in Montana in 2021, adding to and potentially
compounding those resulting from prior extreme events. As such, an analysis of
Montana’s agricultural producers offers a valuable contribution to the gap in empirical
research on NELDs. In conducting this investigation, we explore two questions: 1) how
losses and damages from extreme events are perceived and experienced among
agricultural producers in the rural, developed-nation context of eastern Montana, and 2)
whether and how NELDs are being experienced by this population. To do this, we
leverage an analysis of survey data gathered online during January and February of 2022.
NELD poses a unique threat to individuals and communities, being both
comparable in consequence to more monetarily quantifiable harms (Tschakert et al.,
2019) and also largely unrecognized by most climate impact analyses. The frequently
invisible nature of NELDs means that they typically go unaddressed in major climate
policy actions at the global, national or subnational scales, forgoing significant
opportunities to address this form of loss and damage. An improved understanding of
NELD, supported by additional inputs of empirical research, will help to clarify who is
impacted and how, additionally highlighting avenues for policy responses at various
levels of governance to help cope with these impacts; or avoid them entirely. Given the
above, this study aims to provide insight into how extreme events and resulting harms,
including non-economic harms, are experienced among ranchers and farmers in Montana.
It provides a needed contribution toward the global shortage of empirical research on
NELDs and is additionally timely considering its relevance to the 2023 Paris Agreement
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global stocktake, during which recent progress on Loss and Damage will be assessed
(Thomas et al., 2020).
3.2 BACKGROUND
3.2.1 LOSS AND DAMAGE: A COMPLEX AGENDA
The proliferation of impacts resulting from slow-onset and extreme climatic
events in recent years, coupled with their disproportionate effect on poor and
marginalized communities around the world, underlies the origins of the Loss and
Damage agenda of the UNFCCC (James et al., 2014). This agenda has its roots in the
early 1990s, when the Alliance of Small Island States, highlighting the outsized
contribution of developed nations to global greenhouse gas emissions to climatic change,
called for an international insurance pool to support island nations affected by sea level
rise (Calliari et al., 2020). The Loss and Damage agenda was formally established under
the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) in 2013. Subsequently, it has been termed
the “third pillar” of international climate policy due to its establishment as a separate
agenda from mitigation and adaptation under the 2015 Paris Agreement (Broberg, 2020).
Today, the international agenda is overseen and implemented by the WIM Executive
Committee, a 20-member body made up of representatives of parties to the UNFCCC.
“Loss and Damage” is used in this paper to denote the UNFCCC policy agenda, while
“loss and damage” refers to those residual impacts of climate change which cannot be–or
have not been—avoided through mitigation and adaptation strategies (Roberts & Pelling,
2018).
Negotiations and discourse surrounding the Loss and Damage agenda have been
contentious since the agenda’s emergence. This is due largely to the ongoing debate
surrounding potential litigation against historically high-emitting nations, which comes
with the possibility of required compensation for resulting losses and damages. The WIM
is concerned with those residual impacts that can be effectively linked to anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions, requiring the use of event attribution studies, which leverage
climate models under various greenhouse gas scenarios to determine the probability of a
climatic event exceeding a certain intensity (Stott et al., 2016). Such attribution studies
are necessary in connecting losses and damages from a particular event with
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anthropogenic emissions (Scown et al., 2022), and therefore with the debate around
responsibility for historic emissions described above. Developed nation parties to the
UNFCCC have historically been resistant to the inclusion of attribution in negotiations on
these grounds (Mechler & Schinko, 2016).
Although Loss and Damage has become the subject of a growing body of
academic research (Boyd et al., 2021), several of the agenda’s focus areas still lack
conceptual clarity, resulting in a poor understanding of the problems or impacts to be
addressed. For example, Loss and Damage discourse to date has been plagued by the lack
of a concrete definition, leading to divergent perspectives on the meaning of loss and
damage among scientists, policymakers and practitioners (Boyd et al., 2017, 2021). These
perspectives have been described as a spectrum, within which Loss and Damage has
varying relationships to the UNFCCC mitigation and adaptation objectives (Boyd et al.,
2017). The absence of a concrete definition of Loss and Damage is problematic for
policymakers, for whom crafting responses to climate-related harms is contingent upon
knowing what those harms are. This lack of conceptual clarity is not limited to definitions
of Loss and Damage, however; it also extends to the research and discourse surrounding
NELD.
3.2.2 THE UNIQUE CHALLENGE OF NELD
Serdeczny et al. (2016) describe the scenario of an island community displaced by
sea level rise to frame the core concepts of NELD. The authors suggest that, in such a
context, the loss of arable land is also the loss of landscapes; the loss of historic ways of
knowing might overshadow new ways of generating income, and when fishermen or
farmers are disconnected from their waters or lands, a poignant question emerges: “what
happens to their identity? Is that lost too?” (Serdeczny et al., 2016, p.1). In more basic
terms, non-economic losses and damages are the loss and damage to intangibles that
cannot be traded in markets, and thus the absence of an agreed-upon price to quantify
harm is one of the main reasons why assessing non-economic losses is challenging
(Fankhauser et al., 2014). Under this non-market definition, NELDs encompass a wide
array of impacts, such as loss of cultural heritage, loss of Indigenous and local knowledge
and loss of identities (Boyd et al., 2021). Research has also started to emerge on the
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phenomenon of psychological impacts arising from climate change (Cunsolo et al.,
2020), representing a still-poorly understood type of NELD. Importantly, these noneconomic harms are mediated by societal factors which influence vulnerabilities, and by
culture, which contextualizes how items lost are experienced and valued (Serdeczny et
al., 2016; Serdeczny et al., 2018). The loss of non-quantifiable items and values is deeply
impactful to individuals, note Tschakert et al. (2019), who observe that continuing to
prioritize only quantifiable harms in research and policy (as has been the historical trend)
subverts the importance of non-economic ones, which are “no less significant to people
within their own contexts” (McShane, 2017; Preston, 2017; in Tschakert et al., 2019, p.
59).
Recognition of NELD within the policy and academic literature has expanded
alongside that of the broader Loss and Damage agenda over the past decade (Roberts &
Pelling, 2018; Serdeczny et al., 2016; Tschakert et al., 2019; Tschakert et al., 2017). This
has been attributed partially to increased scientific understanding regarding the limits of
climate adaptation even under modest warming scenarios, and partially to the increasing
attention to loss and damage in international policy negotiations (Tschakert et al., 2019).
On this road to recognition, NELD has evolved along a trajectory from early
deliberations over what could be counted as NELD through subsequent studies proposing
various typologies of non-economic harms. These typologies include framings of NELD
as material and immaterial (Morrissey & Oliver-Smith, 2013) and intrinsic and
instrumental (Serdeczny et al., 2016), among others. Although such typologies may prove
useful for policy and knowledge production purposes, Boyd et al. (2021) note that
because individual experiences with NELD vary immensely depending on worldview,
such categorizations of NELD are potentially infinite.
NELD represents one of the foremost concerns of the WIM Executive Committee
and is identified as a priority action area in the body’s five-year rolling workplan (WIM
ExCom, 2017), however the intangible and highly contextual nature of NELD means it is
infrequently captured in assessments of climate-related impacts, and therefore remains
poorly understood. Loss and Damage research to date generally has been largely
theoretical, with comparatively little empirical research conducted (Thomas et al., 2020).
This lack of studies empirically examining NELDs, including their range, impact, and
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relationship to event, has resulted in a significant blind spot for the Loss and Damage
research field, hindering collective abilities to holistically understand and address losses
and damages (Tschakert et al., 2019). The poor understanding of how NELDs manifest
and who they affect poses a significant challenge for policymakers as well (Serdeczny et
al., 2016). Given low availability of empirical data on NELDs, policymakers may
necessarily turn instead to more quantitative, economic measures of harm. Although such
quantitative approaches can be useful for measuring and reporting, note Tschakert et al.
(2019), prioritizing quantifiable measures of NELDs effectively erases lived experience.
In addition to producing policy that is disconnected from lived realities and therefore
ineffective, McShane (2017) suggests that this erasure of experience constitutes a
significant injustice, particularly when quantitative estimates of loss are aggregated for
comparison’s sake.
Finally, much of the focus of Loss and Damage research, and therefore NELD,
has been on the developing world. The UNFCCC definition of loss and damage in the
body’s online guide to the topic, for example, describes those harms “…associated with
climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2020). Fankhauser et al. (2014) note, as
another example, that in many developing countries, non-economic losses may well be
more significant than economic ones. Despite this historic emphasis on the developing
world, research is emerging which demonstrates the occurrence of NELDs across every
inhabited continent; developed and developing nations alike (Tschakert et al., 2019). In
this context, elucidation of NELDs across all development contexts will be essential to
better understanding these losses and damages, and to the formulation of appropriate,
timely policy responses. Given that individuals with highly climate-dependent
livelihoods, such as farmers and ranchers, may be the most vulnerable to losses and
damages due to their dependence on particular climatic conditions (Yung et al., 2015),
these individuals may be among the first to experience the negative impacts of climate
change. As such, investigating impacts to farmers and ranchers may serve as a leading
indicator of impending climate harms—providing current information for policymakers
across levels of government which may help avoid potential losses and damages in the
future.
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3.3 METHODS
To add an empirical investigation of NELDs to the global literature on L&D, we
leveraged survey data collected from ranchers and farmers with operations east of the
Rocky Mountains in Montana. This survey specifically targeted individuals’ experiences
with extreme events such as drought, heat, wildfire, severe storms, and/or flooding. The
survey instrument is provided in full in the supplementary materials. The survey was
hosted online using the web-based survey tool Qualtrics, with data collected in January
and February of 2022.
We distributed the survey to ranchers and farmers with the assistance of
conservation district5 (CD) staff and Montana State University Extension6 agents. We
first reached out to every CD office within areas 1-4 as designated by the Montana
Association of Conservation Districts (MACD) using contact information provided on the
organization’s website. These areas encompass a total of 37 districts and correspond
generally to the extent of the state east of the Rocky Mountains, the region which best
represents the state’s largely rainfed agricultural characteristics. In districts from which
we received no response, we subsequently contacted the local Extension office. Through
this combined outreach, we were able to contact 26 of the districts, 24 of which agreed to
assist with survey distribution—representing roughly 40% of the districts in the state.
Following initial contact with CD office staff and/or Extension agents, we provided a
template email containing the link to the Qualtrics survey site which they could then
forward to producers, as CD administrators were largely unable to share their contact lists
with the research team. Each point of contact received a follow-up email template three
weeks after the survey link was provided, which encouraged producers to complete the
survey if they had not done so already. All outreach communications are included in
Appendix B. Although the survey was initially intended to be distributed entirely by
email, we granted permission to CD administrators or Extension agents who asked to post

5

Conservation districts are governmental subdivisions of the state with broad responsibility to carry
out programs that conserve soil and water, protect streams and rivers, and improve wildlife habitat
(see www.macd.org)
6
Montana State University (MSU) Extension agriculture and natural resources programs apply
university research and resources to help agricultural producers and landowners increase profits,
reduce loss, protect our food supply and sustain future resources (see https://www.msuextension.org)
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the survey to district social media, websites and/or newsletters. In these cases, we
required administrators to remove the link three weeks after posting. Additionally, survey
participants were allowed to request a paper survey be sent via mail (one was requested).
This method of participant selection was non-randomized, and therefore provided
a non-probability dataset. This precludes generalization of results to a population outside
the sample (i.e., all agricultural producers in MT), however data aggregation, response
counts and frequencies and basic statistical tests nonetheless provided the means to
analyze collected data and yield valuable insight. I calculated response frequencies for
individual survey questions using the total number of respondents who answered each
question, not the total number of survey respondents. Correlations between responses to
pairs of survey questions were determined by calculating Pearson’s coefficient in R;
appropriate for our survey data given that most of the data gathered is ordinal.
The survey received 95 responses, of which18 were non-substantive (i.e. the
respondent opened the survey but responded to no questions). The 77 responses left
included one self-identified as having an operation in Beaverhead County, which was
outside the study area. The respondent also had operations within the study area,
however, so this response was retained. Three responses were removed for which none of
the questions being analyzed here were answered. As a result, only 74 responses were
used in this portion of the analysis.
3.3.1 CASE STUDY LOCATION
Across the western United States, climate change has been linked to declining
snowpack, more frequent drought, and lower stream flows in late summer; all of which
are expected to continue to worsen throughout the 21st century (Frankson et al., 2022).
The northwestern region in particular is projected to experience increases in high
temperature extremes and variability of precipitation timing (IPCC, 2021). Within this
region, the state of Montana –which straddles the junction of the Northern Rockies and
the Great Plains– is projected to continue warming across all its geographic locations,
seasons, and under all emission scenarios throughout the 21st century (Whitlock et al.,
2017). The state’s temperatures are projected to increase by up to 6°F (3°C) by midcentury and up to 9.8°F (5.4°C) by the end of the century based on a “business as usual”
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carbon emission scenario, increases which are larger than the average changes predicted
nationally and globally (Whitlock et al., 2017).
The state of Montana may be particularly exposed to the impacts of climate
change in given its dependence on agriculture, the leading industry in the state, which
generated $4.9 billion through the sale of both crops and livestock from nearly 27,000
farms and ranches in 2020 (USDA, 2020). As of 2017, 62.4% of state land area was
dedicated to farms or ranches, and the sector employed 10% of the state’s labor force in
direct production or related activities (Haynes et al., 2020).
Montana, along with much of the northwestern United States and southwestern
Canada, was affected by severe heat during the early summer of 2021. The heat wave,
which occurred roughly a month before the region’s temperatures typically peak and
exceeded 104°F throughout much of the area, was found in a rapid attribution study to be
virtually impossible without the contribution of anthropogenic forcing (Philip et al.,
2021). This event, which coincided with an exceedingly dry year (CITE), represented a
significant challenge for agricultural producers. The intensity and frequency of such
droughts is projected to increase in the future, state Frankson et al. (2022), who note that
even if regional precipitation increases slightly as projected, rising temperatures will
increase the rate of soil moisture loss during dry spells. Projected temperature and
precipitation increases may be favorable in the short term for some Montana crops and
forage production, but the effects of warming will become increasingly disruptive as they
accelerate beyond adaptation thresholds (Whitlock et al., 2017). Agriculture—and
thereby agricultural producers— are particularly vulnerable to climate change, note Yung
et al. (2015), who suggest that the impacts of climate change on these modes of
production are set to influence rural futures around the world.
3.4 RESULTS
The survey outreach generated responses from participants in three of the four
MACD areas surveyed (Figure 3.1), however identification of the county or counties
within which respondents’ ranching operations were located was an optional response. As
such, the location of some respondents’ operations may not be reflected here. The single
response from outside the study area (Beaverhead County, area 6) is pictured at bottom
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left. Survey respondents were primarily male (74.6%) and largely Caucasian (96.9%)
with a small American Indian/Alaska Native representation (3.1%). The average reported
respondent age was 59.7, very close to the overall average age of U.S. farmers, which
was 57.5 in 2017 (USDA, 2019).

Figure 3.1: Geographic distribution of survey responses within the state of
Montana (Cartographer: Sapana Lohani, Ph.D.)

We first asked survey respondents about their general experiences with extreme
events (such as floods, droughts, storms or fires) using a likert scale matrix to gauge their
agreement with a set of statements (Figure 3.2). 50.6% of those who responded to the
statement “I have noticed changes is extreme events over my lifetime” either somewhat
or strongly agreed. A majority (67.9%) somewhat or strongly agreed that extreme events
were a regular occurrence for as long as they could remember. Finally, although 49.4%
somewhat or strongly agreed that extreme events have become more severe than they
once were, respondents’ agreement about whether extreme events are linked to climate
change was evenly split, with 37% in agreement and 38.3% in disagreement.
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The following questions ask about your experience with extreme
events (such as floods, droughts, storms, fires). Please indicate how
strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements
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Figure 3.2: Responses to survey question regarding participant’s perceptions of extreme events

We subsequently asked respondents about their experience with the impacts of
extreme events, such as floods, droughts, storms, and fires (see Figure 3.3). When asked
to rank their agreement with the statement “I have been negatively impacted by extreme
events,” 79.7% of those who responded either somewhat or strongly agreed. This
reported incidence of negative impacts among participants is supported by statistical
analysis. Responses to the first statement (“I have been negatively impacted”) showed a
strong negative relationship with both the second statement (“I have experienced extreme
events but have NOT been negatively impacted”) and the third (“extreme events have
NOT impacted by livelihood or sources of income”) statements. These correlations
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values were r = -.66 and r = -.61, respectively. The set of statements in this matrix also
inquired about whether respondents had experienced grief or hopelessness as a result of
extreme events, to which 40.0% somewhat or strongly agreed. Finally, 48.6% agreed to
the final statement that, due to increasing severity of extreme events, impacts to
respondents and/or their livelihoods have grown as well.

The following questions ask about the impacts of extreme events
(such as floods, droughts, storms, fires). Please indicate how strongly
you agree or disagree with the following statements.
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Figure 3.3: Responses to question set regarding the impacts of extreme events on individuals
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Responses to a subsequent “check all that apply” question about the impacts
experienced by respondents (see Figure 3.4) revealed “loss of income” and “loss of
physical assets” (like property, crops or livestock) as the most frequent responses,
together representing 63.8% of the total impacts indicated. Additionally, the survey
results reveal distinct evidence that respondents are experiencing NELDs which can be
described as psychological harms resulting from extreme events. In the same check all
that apply question, “sense of loss or grief over environmental destruction” and
“decreased mental health” followed closely in that order behind lost income and lost
physical assets. Combined, these impact categories (environmental grief and mental
health decline) represented just under 25% of the total responses to this question.
Importantly, responses to the “select all that apply” question also indicated non-economic
harms including physical injury or illness, death of friends or family, physical
displacement, and loss of social networks due to extreme events.

Extreme event impacts identified by survey respondents
Loss of income
Loss of physical assets
Sense of loss/grief over environmental damage
Decreased mental health
Physical injury or illness
Loss of networks
Other (please specify)
Death of friends or family
Displaced from residence
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Figure 3.4: Responses to “check all that apply” question about types of impacts resulting from
extreme events
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We subsequently provided respondents with a list of commonly valued items
(livelihood, income, community, family, mental health and local landscape/environment)
which we asked them to rank on a 1-5 scale, with 5 being the most important (see Table
3.1). Respondents ranked family most highly (mean: 4.75), followed by
livelihood/occupation (mean: 4.5), local landscape/environment (mean: 4.13), mental
health (mean: 4.01), income (mean: 4.0), and community (mean 3.77).

Table 3.1: Table of results displaying respondent valuation of commonly valued items

Item Valued

Mean Respondent Valuation

Family

4.75

Livelihood

4.51

Local environment

4.13

Mental health

4.01

Income

4.00

Community

3.77

Next, we asked respondents to think about what they indicated as important in the
previous question regarding valued items. Considering these things as "what [they]
value," we provided another set of matrix statements regarding the impacts of extreme
events on those valued items (see Figure 3.5). Many respondents affirmed that these
valued things had been impacted negatively in the recent past (63.9% somewhat or
strongly agreed), and many also anticipated that negative impacts from extreme events to
those valued items to continue in the near future (57.5% somewhat or strongly agreed). A
smaller percentage (47.9%) expected that extreme events would continue to impact those
valued things for the rest of their lives.
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Think about what you indicated as important to you in the previous
question above. Consider these things as "what you value." Please
indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following
statements about what you value
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Figure 3.5: Results of question set regarding respondents’ perceptions of extreme event impacts
to personally valued items

Subsequently, we asked respondents whether they had experienced livelihoodspecific impacts due to changes in the climate (see Figure 3.6). To this question, 52.1%
answered yes, 21.1% answered no, and 26.8% of respondents were uncertain.
Respondents who selected “yes” to the livelihood impacts question above were directed
to a follow-up question asking them to explain those impacts in detail, with “lost work
hours/days,” “no or little labor available,” and “decreasing interest from young people in
the profession” provided as examples. Of those who answered “yes” above, 73.0%
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provided a response to the follow-up. A variety of livelihood impacts were mentioned in
the responses to this question, but the most-referenced impacts include the increasing
difficulty of growing feed for livestock, the hay purchasing necessitated by that shortfall
in production, and the resulting sale of livestock (often at a reduced cost due to low
animal weight) when the financial burden of purchasing feed became too much.
Collectively, responses in these categories represented 85.2% of all the written answers.

Have you experienced impacts on your job or livelihood due to
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Figure 3.6: Results of yes/no question about climate impacts to respondent livelihoods

One rancher commented that if “…droughts like 2021 become more common I am
not sure how ranches like ours will survive and that scares the hell out of me. I wake up
everyday and try to come up with a way our ranch will survive if it does not rain this
year.” Another wrote “…if the drought conditions continue the majority of the cattle
producers will be out of business next year.” Responses specifically mentioning crop loss
made up 18.5% of the written answers, with one farmer mentioning the inadequacy of
crop insurance for ensuring the profitability of their operation. Water shortages associated
increases in operational costs (18.5%), as well as increased workload and stress on the
part of producers are both well-represented responses (14.8%).
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Respondents that selected “unsure” when asked whether they had experienced
livelihood impacts due to changes in the climate were asked to explain their uncertainty.
Of those who marked “unsure,” 84.2% provided a written follow up explaining why.
Most of the uncertainty regarding whether producers have been impacted by climate
change hinges on uncertainty around human impacts on the climate, with (81.3%) either
directly stating disbelief in climate change explicitly or less explicitly referencing historic
climate variability --or their own experiences with fluctuations in wet/dry cycles-- as
reasons for skepticism. A few others were uncertain about impacts to their livelihoods
given that factors other than climate change may have played a role in impacting their
livelihoods (18.8%).
Another page of questions in the survey presented several statements about the
impacts of extreme events on respondents’ livelihoods (Figure 3.7). When asked whether
they would change livelihoods given the occurrence of a drought comparable to 2021 at a
frequency of every five years, only 18.3% of those who responded somewhat or strongly
agreed. Conversely, asked the same question under an annual drought occurrence
scenario, the percentage of respondents that would change livelihoods jumped to 57.1%.
Respondents largely disagreed to a statement about extreme events influencing their past
somewhat or strongly disagreed to a statement that past extreme events had influenced a
decision that led them to relocate, while only 8.6% agreed. In a final statement, 71.4% of
respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that making a transition out of their job or
livelihood would be difficult for them.
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The following questions ask about the impact of extreme events on your job
or livelihood. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
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Figure 3.7: Results of question set regarding specific extreme event impacts to respondent
livelihoods

The final survey question presented statements about respondents’ perceptions
about potential future impacts of extreme events (Figure 3.8). In response to the first
matrix statement: “I feel hopeful about the future, even if extreme events such as drought
or wildfires continue to affect my region,” 74.3% somewhat or strongly agreed. In
contrast, only 12.9% somewhat or strongly disagreed to the same question. Many
respondents (61.4%) disagreed when asked if they lacked confidence in their capabilities
to cope with extreme event impacts. On the other hand, 50.7% agreed when asked
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whether they felt concern about the ability of others within their communities to cope.
When asked to rank their agreement with the statement “I feel helpless and unable to
control my responses to extreme events,” only 10.3% agreed, none strongly. On the other
hand, 76.5% somewhat or strongly disagreed.

The following questions ask about your perceptions of extreme events
and how they may affect you and others in the future. Please indicate
how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements
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Figure 3.8: Results of survey question set regarding respondents’ perceptions of extreme events and
potential future impacts

3.5 DISCUSSION
3.5.1 PERCEPTIONS OF LOSSES AND DAMAGES AMONG RESPONDENTS
The research questions of this study ask whether and how Montana ranchers and
farmers are experiencing and perceiving losses and damages, including NELDs, resulting
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from extreme events. The answers of respondents to the survey questions are a strong
statement of negative impacts experienced, and clearly characterize those negative
impacts as being both economic and non-economic in nature. As noted above, the
majority of respondents identified having been negatively impacted by extreme events,
with “loss of income” and “loss of physical assets” (like property, crops or livestock)
being the most-selected responses from a provided list. When asked to describe the
impacts of extreme events on their livelihoods, participants’ responses had several
consistent themes. Many noted struggles with loss of pasture and hay production, leading
livestock feeding costs to increase considerably. For many, this leads to selling off
livestock, or decreased income due to lower animal weight at time of sale or harvest. “If
the drought conditions continue,” one respondent wrote, “the majority of the cattle
producers will be out of business next year.” Crop loss and decreasing water availability
due to drought were commonly noted, while others described labor shortages and other
increases in production cost.
The primarily economic impacts noted above, however, are accompanied by the
distinct presence of non-economic harms among respondents, of which the most common
can be described as psychological impacts. For example, “sense of loss or grief over
environmental destruction” and “decreased mental health” followed closely in that order
behind lost income and lost physical assets when respondents were asked to select the
impacts they had experienced. Combined, these impact categories (environmental grief
and mental health decline) represent under 25% of the total responses to this question.
Importantly, these were not the only non-economic harms identified by the survey.
Respondents also noted non-economic harms including physical injury or illness, death of
friends or family, physical displacement, and loss of social networks due to extreme
events. Although the discussion below focuses on psychological impacts among
respondents, the multitude of NELDs resulting from extreme event occurrences and other
socio-cultural factors is potentially limitless (Boyd et al., 2021). The relevance of these
additional NELDs to respondent experiences should not be understated.
The finding of psychological NELDs among respondents is striking, given that
this type of climate impact, particularly as it affects ranchers and farmers, appears thinly
discussed in the academic literature. In a systematic review of risk factors that affect
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farmers’ health, for example, Yazd et al. (2019) found that only 5% of U.S.-based studies
investigating psychological distress among farmers explored climate change as a stressor.
Grounding our survey findings in the broader literature on psychology and climate
change, however, suggests that grief and decreased mental health among ranchers and
farmers should be anything but surprising. Empirical evidence demonstrating both the
acute and chronic mental health effects of climate change has risen sharply over the past
decade, and an array of studies have begun emerging which examine the psychological
and mental health effects of climate-related hazards (Cunsolo et al., 2020). Several new
terms for climate-induced psychological distress have recently emerged, including
“ecological grief,” “solastalgia,” and “eco-anxiety” (Comtesse et al., 2021, p.3).
Psychological harms related to climate change have been conceptualized as occurring
both “directly” and “indirectly” (Berry et al., 2010; Cianconi et al., 2020; Comtesse et al.,
2021), with direct harms including traumatic stress reactions to events like wildfire or
floods, and indirect harms being incurred via longer-term, secondary stressors like crop
failure, decreasing availability of water resources, or permanent landscape changes
(Comtesse et al., 2021). As such, these impacts can be both acute and chronic, affecting
individuals in the short term time frames surrounding the occurrence of extreme events,
but importantly in the longer term as well (Comtesse et al., 2021). Cunsolo et al. (2020)
note that these impacts are particularly pronounced among people with close
relationships with the natural environment, such as Indigenous Peoples, farmers,
foresters, etc. Because of this heightened vulnerability, there is reason to believe that
incidences of psychological NELDs like those present in the survey responses are likely
to increase rapidly, rendering this a legitimate concern for ranchers and farmers across
the region.
Additionally, a large volume of research has explored the general mental health
stresses frequently experienced by those in agricultural professions. Available evidence
shows that the agricultural sector globally has long experienced higher rates of
psychological distress, depression, anxiety and suicide than the general population
(Bjornestad et al., 2021; Henning-Smith et al., 2022). Among agricultural populations in
the U.S., many studies have focused on the Midwest. Rudolphi et al. (2020) found that,
among a sample of young Midwestern farmers and ranchers, approximately 71% of
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respondents met the criteria for generalized anxiety disorder, compared to the U.S. adult
average of 18.1%. Within the same sample, the authors found that 53% of study
participants met the criteria for depressive disorder, which has an average frequency of
annual occurrence among U.S. adults of 6.7% (Rudolphi et al., 2020). As mentioned
above, however, few studies investigating mental health challenges among agricultural
producers specifically looked at climate change as a stressor (Yazd et al., 2019).
The disconnect between climate change and the psychological well-being of
agricultural producers in the academic literature makes our survey findings, which
provide empirical evidence of a direct connection, particularly salient. Our findings also
suggest that valuable avenues for future research include deeper qualitative exploration of
how psychological NELDs manifest among ranchers and farmers, including who is
impacted, and how. As noted above, a thorough empirical understanding of noneconomic harms is essential to formulating appropriate responses. To this point, our
study’s explicit framing of psychological impacts as losses and damages resulting from
extreme events raises important questions about potential policy responses in the context
of the Loss and Damage agenda.
Given that psychological harms like grief and decreased mental health represent
both losses and damages already incurred and also those that will continue to affect
ranchers and farmers in the future, responses from the Loss and Damage policy
perspective would entail actions both to mitigate and address existing harms and also to
avert future harms This might include (but is certainly not limited to) providing subsidies
for and increased access to mental health services for producers both to address existing
harms and avert those potentially resulting from lengthier experiences with climatedriven grief and anxiety. An improved understanding of the problem, coupled with an
informed, effective policy response drawing from the Loss and Damage perspective, may
provide a meaningful response to NELDs—a body of climate impacts likely to rise in
frequency among ranchers and farmers in Montana and beyond.
3.5.2 WHEN IS ENOUGH, ENOUGH? EVIDENCE OF A LIVELIHOOD TIPPING POINT
Alongside the explicit evidence of psychological NELDs in the survey data is a
second finding with important implications for Montana ranchers and farmers. That is,
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there appears to be a tipping point at which, given a high enough frequency of extreme
event occurrences (the survey asked specifically about recurrence of the 2021 drought),
many respondents would opt to change their livelihoods. This finding was accompanied
by strong indications that respondents are averse to making such a shift: the majority
claim to have weathered previous extreme events without changing livelihoods, and a
similar majority acknowledged the significant difficulty that such a transition would
represent for them. These potential thresholds present within the state’s agricultural
systems are acknowledged in the Montana Climate Assessment (Whitlock et al., 2017),
which states that “the masked and messy shifts that are underway may reach tipping
points that enable and/ or force rapid, transformational change in our food systems”
(Whitlock et al., 2017, p.235). Importantly, the authors suggest that although many
factors have buffered against these tipping points to date including surplus harvests, crop
insurance, disaster assistance, off- farm income, on-farm ingenuity, market flexibility,
and the intrinsic resilience of our landscapes, the capacity for buffering against
accelerating climate change is finite (Whitlock et al., 2017). The survey finding,
combined with the Montana Climate Assessment’s suggestion that agricultural “buffers”
may be reaching their limits to help producers cope, has implications for individual
ranchers and farmers, communities, and society more broadly, and also for policymakers.
Regarding implications for individuals, the survey’s questions about what
respondents value become relevant. Interestingly, although the mean valuation of
livelihood ranked second highest, income ranked second lowest. Although the difference
between the two means is not large in general terms, the discrepancy suggests that
livelihoods are valued by respondents for reasons that are not strictly financial in nature.
This is not entirely surprising; Serdeczny et al. (2016) note the close connection of landbased livelihoods like ranching and farming to individual identities, suggesting that
livelihood disruption and dislocation from the land can therefore represent significant
personal losses for individuals. Given that agriculture plays a dominant role in Montana’s
land use and its people’s sense of place (Whitlock et al., 2017), a large-scale livelihood
transitions driven by climate change would undoubtedly have significant impacts at the
level of individual ranchers and farmers.
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Climate-driven shifts away from agricultural livelihoods have obvious
implications, both for local communities and for society and food systems more broadly.
Climate change already poses a significant threat to agriculture by means of reduced
production, a challenge which will likely be compounded population growth drives
increased food demand (Loboguerrero et al., 2019). Decreasing numbers of producers has
the potential to worsen the compounding strain on food systems. Additionally, however,
a climate-driven shift away from ranching or farming livelihoods in the region may lead
to larger-scale losses of knowledge and ways of thinking that are integral to those
livelihood systems (Morrissey & Oliver-Smith, 2013)
These findings present an indicator of a potentially imminent threshold. Given the
importance of agriculture to individuals and communities in Montana, as well as its
significance as the state’s top industry (USDA, 2021), our finding merits serious
consideration among policymakers. How can policy responses help prepare for this
eventuality as climate change continues to drive temperature and precipitation shifts
across the region? Insights from the global Loss and Damage policy perspective may help
inform potential responses by suggesting how targeted policy strategies might both
address existing harms and prevent those with the potential to occur in the future.
The livelihood threshold finding suggests a climate-related impact which is
impending for some and may have already occurred for others. As such, the Loss and
Damage policy perspective might suggest two response avenues: supporting ranchers and
farmers in coping with the effects of climate change pre-threshold and supporting their
subsequent livelihood transitions once that shift was no longer preventable. Pre-threshold
policy actions might include stepping up financial and technical support for producers’
climate adaptation efforts. Post-threshold actions would likely entail mitigating harms
incurred through the transition—potentially via financial compensation—while
additionally providing support and capacity building for individuals navigating transition
away from ranching or farming.
3.5.3 A PARADOX OF GRIEF AND HOPE
Given the experiences of respondents with psychological NELDs and the
existence of a threshold at which many anticipate changing their livelihoods, a third and
unanticipated survey finding emerged: that most respondents look to the future with
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hope. Interestingly, having experienced negative impacts from extreme events does not
appear to be a predictor of whether a respondent feels hopeful about the future or not.
Similarly, experiences with grief or decreased mental health do not appear to preclude
hope among respondents, indicating that some alternate factor or factors underly this
finding. Aside from this potentially paradoxical finding in the survey data, the concept of
hope itself is interesting in the context of Loss and Damage.
Li & Monroe (2019) describe hope as “not only a pleasant feeling, but also a
motivational force” (p.936). To this point, it seems that hope may be relevant to Loss and
Damage by way of providing ranchers and farmers with motivation to adapt to changing
climatic conditions and to prepare themselves and their livelihoods to cope with future
impacts. For example, past research has linked hope in individuals to improved adaptive
responses under adverse conditions (Marlon et al., 2019), increased problem-solving
capabilities, and recovery from depressive symptoms (Li & Monroe, 2019). If this is the
case, an investigation of what fosters hope among individuals coping with the impacts of
climate extremes may be extremely relevant, and should be pursued
Additionally, Marlon et al. (2019) point out several distinctions between types of
hope which may also prove relevant when considering how to leverage this finding in
favor of preventing or addressing losses and damages. The authors suggest the existence
of what they call “false hope” and “constructive hope,” describing false hope as the belief
that a problem (i.e., climate change) will resolve without the need for human
intervention. Constructive hope, on the other hand, may arise from seeing others act or
believing that collective awareness of climate change is rising (Marlon et al., 2019). It
seems that these different types of hope, if present among ranchers and farmers, might
serve as predictors regarding the efficacy of various Loss and Damage policy options.
Depending on the type of hope most prevalent among ranchers and farmers, individuals
might be more or less likely to take adaptation actions in preparation for future climate
impacts. A hope that collective efforts –including policy efforts—can help producers
cope with climate change, for example, may provide a more receptive starting point for
effective policy action than a widespread hope that climate change will resolve itself.
Following from the potential of hope to motivate adaptive responses among
agricultural producers or foreshadow opportunities for effective Loss and Damage policy
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responses, an important question arises: what allows respondents to have hope, even
when they may have incurred losses and damages stemming from climate extremes?
Although the survey’s finding of hope is both surprising and relevant to discussions of
Loss and Damage, our limited statistical analyses revealed no strong relationships that
explained hope’s presence among respondents. A combination of our limited results with
a review of relevant literature offers a few speculative insights, but no concrete
explanations for the survey’s hope finding-- or a firm basis for potential policy responses.
An explanation of hope, therefore, provides a valuable starting point for future research.
One potential explanation of hope among respondents concerns their feelings of
agency, or ability to control their responses to extreme events. We found a very slight
positive correlation between respondents’ perceived agency and feelings of hope for the
future. Although the relationship is not strong enough to draw firm conclusions, there is
some conceptual support for the finding. In much of the climate-related research
surrounding hope as a motivator, hope is often discussed in tandem with efficacy, termed
by some as “the foundation of agency” (Bandura, 2000). A frequent conclusion is that
feeling effective –or personally able to do something about a problem-- is a significant
and direct path to hope (Li & Monroe, 2019). This may be applicable to the challenges
faced by Montana ranchers and farmers: if producers feel a sense of efficacy regarding
their responses to extreme events (via the ability to make on-farm drought adaptations,
for example), they may feel a broader sense of agency and a corresponding hope for the
future. A second explanation may arise from the buffering effect discussed by Whitlock
et al., (2017). As previously discussed, the effects of coping tools/policy instruments like
subsidies, insurance, and disaster assistance, as well as the resilience of landscapes have
played a role to date in buffering climate-driven changes in Montana’s food systems and
agricultural livelihoods (Whitlock et al. 2017). It is possible that given the past adequacy
of these buffering factors in blunting the worst impacts of climate extremes for some
ranchers and farmers, there may be reason to feel hopeful that they would continue to do
so in the future, regardless of the realistically finite capacity of these buffering factors.
Finally, many respondents voiced skepticism (or complete disbelief) regarding the role of
climate change in the increasing severity and frequency of extreme events. An illustrative
response from one participant stated that “what is being called climate change may be
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normal climate in the big picture. There has always been ‘climate change.’" Given the
frequency of such views, it is worth asking whether or not this perspective might
contribute to a hopeful outlook on the future. If increasingly frequent and severe
droughts, wildfires, and/or floods are viewed as part of natural climatic cycles rather than
a steadily worsening trend, might these individuals be predisposed to hope?
As previously stated, the suggestions above are speculative and reflect the limited
explanatory power of our survey findings regarding respondents’ feelings of hope for the
future. Given the potential relevance of hope to motivating adaptive action among
producers (and therefore potential policy actions to leverage that hope-driven
motivation), this finding is worthy of additional study. The potential explanations
mentioned above represent possible considerations for such future research, which may
provide beneficial insights into relationships between climate extremes, agricultural
producers, and perceptions of hope for the future.
3.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter aimed to answer questions about how losses and damages resulting
from extreme events, including non-economic losses and damages, are experienced and
perceived by farmers and ranchers in the developed-nation context of eastern Montana.
Through a survey of this population and their experiences with extreme events, we
provide empirically based insights into how both types of climate-related harm are
manifesting. We found that both economic and non-economic losses and damages
resulting from extreme events are experienced and perceived among respondents. We
additionally found evidence of an apparent threshold at which, given increasing
frequency of extreme events, many respondents anticipate changing their livelihoods.
Finally, we found that, despite impacts from extreme events, many respondents retain
hope for the future.
Our results underscore the conclusions of recent research that losses and damages
are occurring globally and across all development contexts. Importantly, this survey’s
clear finding of losses and damages including grief and decreased mental health among
respondents indicates that, although historic framings of losses and damages as
developing world occurrences may preclude developed-world climate impacts from being
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framed as such, climate-related harms—both economic and non-economic in nature—are
clearly and currently affecting agricultural producers in eastern Montana.
These findings suggest that continued work to frame climate-related harms within
developed nations as losses and damages can productively contribute to a holistic global
understanding of loss and damage. They additionally suggest that the Loss and Damage
perspective may be valuable by providing an alternate framing of climate impacts than is
currently being employed, with potential implications for policy.
First, starting to frame climate impacts like grief and anxiety as losses and
damages, and viewing them through this alternative lens, might encourage valuing those
harms in a manner consistent with those of economic harms such as loss of property
and/or life. Second, taking a loss and damage perspective would also encourage deeper
thinking about the disproportionality of harm within a place like the United States, in
addition to disproportionality across nations and development contexts. Important
questions follow from such a reframing of harms as losses and damages, including how is
intra-national disproportionality of climate impacts addressed in national- and/or globallevel climate policy, and how are non-economic harms addressed, as they are having an
impact on individuals despite their intangible nature? Such questions might provide an inroad into discussions of liability and compensation domestically, e.g., whether and how
to hold industries and corporations accountable for their historic and contemporary
contributions to these impacts. Despite the likely contention over discussions of liability
and compensation within countries like the United States, these possibilities are important
ones to consider and will inherently evolve as a focus on climate justice continues to
emerge from civil society across the globe as evidenced by the increasing number of civil
and criminal climate lawsuits, and increasing frequency, intensity, and focus of public
protests. The losses and damages we find evidence of in this survey will likely worsen in
coming years; finding ways to grapple with these domestically is imperative for the wellbeing of vulnerable populations and is responsibility of nation states to their people.
In closing, the results of this survey both empirically demonstrate occurrences of
loss and damage and offer insights for addressing these harms through future research
and policy actions. They represent incremental but useful progress toward an improved
global understanding of where climate-related harms are manifesting and how.
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4. CONCLUSION
In every corner of the world, humanity is faced with a sobering reality: the earth’s
climate is changing rapidly, and there is no certainty that collective global action will
happen fast enough to prevent the worst effects of these changes, particularly for the
world’s most vulnerable people. Loss and Damage policy, in this context, responds to the
poignant global question: “what happens when the best we can do is no longer enough?”
Many knowledge gaps remain regarding how the world will respond to the inevitable
losses and damages occurring today despite mitigation and adaptation efforts.
The broad questions that drove this research were framed around two perspectives
from which Loss and Damage research has not been commonly approached. My first
question and chapter adopted the perspective of the emerging “national turn” in Loss and
Damage research (Calliari & Vanhala, 2022), specifically considering whether and how
the global Loss and Damage agenda is incorporated into national-level climate policy in
the country of Chile, which currently has no explicit Loss and Damage mechanisms. My
second question took the perspective that historic framings of Loss and Damage as a
largely developing-world occurrence may prevent losses and damages in developed
world contexts from being framed or recognized as such. Recent research has
documented climate-related harms (including NELDs) across every inhabited continent
(Tschakert et al., 2019), underscoring the need for continued empirical research on the
impact and assessment of losses and damages across all geographic and development
contexts. As such, I leveraged survey data to explore whether and how losses and
damages, including non-economic losses and damages, are manifesting in the rural,
developed-world context of the U.S. state of Montana.
4.1 LESSONS LEARNED
The research perspectives and questions outlined above guided my exploration of
Loss and Damage across two national contexts and from the level of individual
experiences to the level of national climate policy. From this broad research scope,
several lessons regarding Loss and Damage emerged. First, in the context of the “national
turn,” it seems that the applicability of certain elements of Loss and Damage likely vary
from country to country. Depending on national climatic, historical, and political
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economic contexts, some components of the global agenda may be easier or more
challenging for individual nations to incorporate into their existing national frameworks,
and thus may be variably represented. As highlighted in the Chilean policy analysis,
event attribution may be significantly less relevant to individual nations than it is to the
global agenda, where questions of assigning liability for harm (and therefore
compensation) are of central concern. Given that individual nations may be preoccupied
by simply coping with climate impacts, a national-level focus on attribution may detract
from more strategic priorities like reducing structural inequities that underly uneven
vulnerabilities to climate change. The attribution example highlights that loss and
Damage cannot be a “one size fits all” policy template for countries grappling with
climate-driven harms. This in turn suggests the need for improved articulation and
feedback between the international agenda and existing national-level climate policy
frameworks.
Second, and related to the lesson above, it appears that for implementation of
Loss and Damage strategies to be undertaken, nations must be both aware of inevitable
climate impacts and motivated to do something about them. A simple awareness of the
Loss and Damage agenda may not provide sufficient motivation to render implementing
Loss and Damage strategies feasible. Motivation (or lack thereof) may might stem from
many sources, including national climate impacts which are not yet existential or a lack
of perceived need to place blame and secure compensation for climate impacts. With this
understanding, if facilitating the implementation of national mechanisms is an objective
of Loss and Damage actors at the global level, the factors which motivate national
policymakers (or not) must be better understood.
Finally, the actual impacts of climate change, both physical and immaterial, are a
global reality, the manifestation of which depends largely on who is vulnerable and what
is valued. Currently, these impacts are affecting every inhabited continent on earth, even
though historically the concept has largely been focused on developing nations due to
their relative vulnerability. Importantly, as illustrated in Montana through our finding of
psychological climate impacts among agricultural producers, losses and damages in some
contexts are certainly occurring which are not being framed as such. This suggests that
disconnects between lived experience, research and policy on Loss and Damage still
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exist, and that developing approaches to address actual harms as contexts dictate will be
central to building a cohesive response to climate-related harms worldwide.
4.2 LIMITATIONS
As with all research, both studies contained in this thesis have limitations. In the
first chapter specifically, several limitations exist. First, given my time constraints, I
focused this analysis narrowly on Chile’s large national-level climate policies. It is
possible, however, that elements of the global Loss and Damage agenda are present
within other areas of Chilean policy. Responses mirroring the global agenda might
manifest within public health policy, disaster response policy, or sub-national or sectoral
climate policies that are tailored to the contexts of specific locations or sectors.
Therefore, there may well be components of the country’s response to losses and
damages that are not captured here, meaning that my results may not provide a
comprehensive understanding of Chile’s approach to losses and damages. Additionally,
two of the Chilean policies analyzed have not been updated in several years. As such,
evolutions in Chile’s national thinking (and subsequent administrative policy) on Loss
and Damage may have occurred in recent years which are not reflected in the documents
analyzed. On a similar note, the draft framework climate bill analyzed is currently being
debated in Chilean Congress and may include different provisions relevant to Loss and
Damage if it is signed into law. Finally, the addition of qualitative interviews with
Chilean ministry officials would have provided valuable context and grounding for the
policy analysis.
Concerning the survey of Montana farmers and ranchers, time and financial
constraints necessitated a non-probability, opportunistic sampling strategy, and as such
the results cannot be generalized to any broader population beyond our sample.
Additionally, we conducted the survey primarily by electronic means, meaning that many
ranchers and farmers who lack computer or internet access were potentially excluded
who may have participated in a paper, phone, or in person survey.
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4.3 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The findings of this study suggest that the applicability of the global Loss and
Damage policy agenda will vary from one national context to another, and that a “one
size fits all” approach to addressing losses and damages ignores the very different
national and sub-national realities that shape how climate-related harms manifest. As
such, supporting and expanding the “national turn” in loss and damage research will
require scholars to develop a more thorough understanding of what works and what
doesn’t across different national contexts. This research effort will be important in
fostering the success of national actors pursuing strategies to address losses and damages
and may entail several different research avenues. First, scholars should continue
developing the global understanding of national approaches for averting, minimizing and
addressing loss and damage, which is still nascent.. Second, future research must work to
understand whether and how existing national strategies are working, whether are they
effective, and how efficacy is determined by different national actors.
Collective knowledge about which Loss and Damage policy responses work and
which don’t must be supported by an improved understanding of the actual impacts of
climate change. This research direction echoes the calls noted earlier for additional
empirical research on different kinds of loss and damage. As suggested by the results of
the Montana survey, future empirical research should consider losses and damages
occurring across all national and development contexts, explicitly framing climate-related
losses and damages as such across developed and developing contexts alike.
Finally, future research must consider the numerous drivers of vulnerability to
climate-related harm. Climate change is “a conundrum of politics and justice,” not solely
an environmental phenomenon (Tanner et al., 2015, p.23). Future research must therefore
aim not only to examine harms incurred and strategies to address those harms, but the
structural inequities and marginalization that underly disproportionate losses and
damages. An extension of this research should lead to consideration of possibilities for
systemic transformation. There is a growing interest in the intentional transformation of
social-ecological systems in pursuit of both human and ecological well-being (e.g.,
Blythe et al., 2018; Chaffin et al., 2016; Moore et al., 2014). Regardless of this growing
interest, however, Tschakert et al. (2013) suggest that analyses explicitly addressing the

83

structural drivers of vulnerability (including but not limited to marginalization, poverty,
and constraining social-ecological dynamics) are urgently needed. The authors also point
out that focusing on the underlying capacity for transformative change is critical at a time
when incremental adjustments to a changing world are too slow or ineffective, especially
for millions of poor and marginalized people.
In the context of Loss and Damage, transformative change provides an
opportunity to rethink the systems that inherently predispose certain individuals and
population to climate-related harm. Loss and Damage policy focuses inherently on
addressing losses and damages; assuming that such harms will happen and considering
policy responses to address them. A transformative approach to addressing loss and
damage, on the other hand, would surpass “avert, minimize, address,” and consider
instead how forced changed to social-ecological systems could ensure that losses and
damages either do not manifest, or fail to impact human and ecological communities
because underlying vulnerabilities such as poverty, uneven development or inequitable
access to resources have been addressed. By framing future research on loss and damage
in a manner that shines a light on institutional structures which underly vulnerability to
climate change, scholars can reveal both the need for and the opportunities to pursue
transformative solutions in the face of accelerating climate change.
4.4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings of this thesis underscore the assertions of recent research: that
climate-related harms are exceeding the coping capacities of individuals and communities
around the world. As revealed by the survey of Montana farmers and ranchers, this
includes impacts occurring domestically in the United States, suggesting that national
Loss and Damage policies may have relevance even in developed nations of the global
north. The recommendations below may prove relevant for addressing Loss and Damage
in the context of a country like the U.S. and may become increasingly relevant as
climate-related impacts continue to multiply.
1. Anticipating harms: To avoid those losses and damages that are preventable,
national actors will require strategies to anticipate the likely geographic and
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contextual distribution of losses and damages. Such policy strategies, which might
include funding academic research or national task forces to understand
vulnerabilities, may already be underway in many nations, but will be essential to
develop in nations where they are not. Anticipatory strategies will be central to
averting harm before it occurs-- ideally incorporating considerations of both
economic and non-economic losses and damages.
2. Avoiding loss and damage: Avoiding loss and damage necessarily leans on an
understanding of potential harms developed through the anticipatory strategies
above. Considering the findings of the Montana survey, strategies to avoid
climate-related harms like grief or decreased mental health might entail
establishing better access to (and funding for) mental health services for
agricultural producers. Regarding the livelihood threshold finding, avoidance
strategies might entail efforts to allow producers to remain in their livelihoods
despite the occurrence of extreme events, such as provision of adaptation
assistance for farmers working to transition to drought-tolerant crops.
3. Mitigating loss and damage: Provision of frameworks and funding to address and,
when necessary, compensate for inevitable losses and damages represents a final
component of a potential national Loss and Damage policy. National funding for
Loss and Damage might potentially be obtained by means of holding individual
companies accountable for emissions, however this strategy might face steeper
challenges in countries without a history of holding industry accountable.
Mitigating incurred losses and damages could entail a wide variety of strategies.
Examples might include establishing a national fund to compensate for damages
to personal property or public infrastructure. It might entail funding for and
expanded access to mental health services for populations vulnerable to climaterelated grief and anxiety. And finally, it might also include funding and services
for helping individuals navigate climate-induced changes to livelihoods or
locations.
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4. Use knowledge of losses and damages to inform transformative processes: The
previous policy recommendations, although aimed at minimizing climate-related
harms, are limited by their operation within systems of inequity and
marginalization. Adopting a Loss and Damage perspective could encourage
pushing for structural transformation to address the inequities and systemic
marginalizations that perpetuate disproportionate losses and damages. The
adoption of a Loss and Damage perspective among policymakers must be
accompanied by a move toward structural transformation to dismantle systems
that perpetuate disproportionate drivers of vulnerability such as poverty,
corruption, and uneven access to resources. An improved collective knowledge
about losses and damages and uneven vulnerabilities must be linked with policy
responses in pursuit of transforming systems that perpetuate disproportionate
susceptibility to climate-related harm.
These recommendations are only a starting point, and many alternate policy
responses to Loss and Damage could be conceptualized to meet the needs and contexts of
various nations. As acknowledged above, part of establishing national-level Loss and
Damage strategies must be a recognition of the threat posed by unavoidable climate
harms, however recognition of harms must be accompanied by the motivation to address
them. Given that developed countries like the U.S. have historically been hesitant to
address Loss and Damage outside the context of adaptation globally, the motivation to
address it domestically may or not yet exist. In closing, the two chapters of this thesis,
together offer insight into how the global Loss and Damage agenda may be
conceptualized and leveraged across disparate global contexts. Although much remains to
be learned, I hope that this work will make a small contribution as the world’s nations,
communities and individuals move together towards a climate future that is anything but
certain.
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY DISTRIBUTION MATERIALS

(1) Preliminary outreach email to Conservation District Managers/Administrators:
Dear ______,
My name is Libby Tobey and I am a graduate student in the University of Montana's
Resource Conservation MS program. As part of my thesis research, I am exploring how
Montana agricultural producers east of the Rocky Mountains are affected by drought
and/or other extreme events such as fires, floods, or storms. Specifically, I am interested
in what losses and damages they may have experienced. I have designed a survey on this
topic with my advisor, Dr. Brian Chaffin, and we will be ready for distribution shortly.
Is it possible for you to assist us in getting this survey into the hands of producers within
your district? The survey is hosted online using Qualtrics, and can be taken on a desktop,
tablet or smartphone. We also hope to follow up with producers via email after 2-3 weeks
to request that those who have not yet completed the survey do so.
If you're able to help us with distribution, I would greatly appreciate it! I will follow up
with an email you can forward to producers in your district. Please don't hesitate to reach
out with questions or clarifications. Thanks so much for your time and I look forward to
connecting!

(2) Email providing Conservation District Managers/Administrators with outreach
text and survey link for Producers:
Hello _________,
Thank you so much for your willingness to help distribute this survey to producers within
your district!
I’ve provided the text of an email (see 2a below) for you to forward to producers. The
email explains a bit about the survey, clarifies that it comes from the University of
Montana and NOT the Conservation District, and provides the link to the survey itself. I
will follow up with you in 2 weeks to provide a second email to be forwarded to
producers. This second email will be a simple reminder to complete the survey if they
haven't done so already.
If you as the district administrator have concerns before, during or after sending the
survey link to your producer list, you may also contact the research team or UM IRB.
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Thanks so much for your assistance, and please don’t hesitate to reach back out to me
with questions.
(2a) Text to be forwarded from Conservation District Managers/Administrators to
producers:
Hello,
I am reaching out with information on (and a link to) a new survey from the University of
Montana. The research team behind the survey hopes to learn how extreme weather
events such as drought, fires, floods or storms are impacting crop producers in Eastern
Montana, and would greatly appreciate your participation! More information is provided
at the beginning of the survey, which can be taken on a desktop, tablet or smartphone.
Responses to the survey will be completely anonymous, so no one (including the research
team) will ever be able to link your identity to your response. If you have questions or
concerns about the survey, you can contact the research team or the University IRB as
directed in the survey's introductory text.
Link to survey:
(3) Follow-up email to providers (via Conservation District
Managers/Administrators):
Hello,
This email is a reminder to please complete the University of Montana survey if you have
not already done so. The survey link is below.
If you have already completed the survey, you may disregard this message. Sincere
thanks for your time and participation in this study!
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY INSTRUMENT

SURVEY: Impacts of Extreme Events on Montana’s Agricultural Producers
The University of Montana is conducting a study on the experience of Montana's
agricultural producers with extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods, and
wildfires. Specifically, we hope to learn how individuals like you have experienced
extreme events over time, and to better understand any impacts these events have had on
you, your family, and/or your businesses. Your responses are important and will help
inform our understanding of the impacts of extreme events on Montana’s farmers and
ranchers. Your responses will also help a graduate student complete their degree!
Please have the adult (age 18 or over) who is most involved with operation-related
decisions and management complete this 10-15 minute survey. More information about
this survey will be presented on the next page. Thank you in advance for your time, your
participation is sincerely appreciated!
Dr. Brian Chaffin, Associate Professor
W.A. Franke College of Forestry & Conservation
University of Montana
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Q1)
Montana Impacts of Extreme Events Survey Information
Why did this survey come to my inbox or house?
We sent this survey to a small number of agricultural producers in Montana. Survey
results will represent producers across the state.
Who should take the survey?
The adult age 18 or older who is most involved with operation-related decisions and
management.
What should this person do?
Answer the questions online using the provided link. If you do not have internet access or
would prefer to take a paper version of this survey, please contact the researchers listed
below and we will mail you a copy of the survey within the next three weeks.
Who is asking these questions?
Researchers at the University of Montana's College of Forestry & Conservation. This
research is funded by the University of Montana in partnership with Lund University in
Sweden.
Has this study been approved by the University?
The UM Institutional Review Board has approved the survey (IRB approval #71-21).
Is this voluntary?
Yes. Your participation is voluntary and will not affect your relationship with UM. You
may stop the survey at any time or skip any question you do not wish to answer. We will
not pay you to take part in this study.
What are the possible benefits to you?
Your participation will help inform research on the impacts of extreme events on
Montana’s farming and ranching families. However, you may not get any direct benefit
from participating in this research study.
Will my answers be kept confidential?
Yes. Any responses you provide to the online survey will be anonymous. If you request a
mail survey, your responses will never be linked with your mailing address or name.
Your answers will be combined with others’ answers in all reports, papers, presentations,
and analyses with no indication of who gave any particular answer. No identifying
information will be reported. Thus, there are no known risks to participating.
Who uses this information?
The primary users are the researchers who designed the survey. The information from
this study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings.
Who do I contact if I have questions about the survey?
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Contact: Elizabeth Tobey, Graduate Research Assistant (801) 680-1238,
elizabeth.tobey@umontana.edu; or Dr. Brian Chaffin, Principal Investigator (406) 2436575, brian.chaffin@umontana.edu.
Who do I contact if I have questions about my rights as a research participant?
Contact the Institutional Review Board at the University of Montana at (406) 243-6672
or irb@umontana.edu.
You are voluntarily making a decision whether or not to participate in this research study.
By filling in the "I agree" bubble below, your consent to participate is implied. You
should photocopy a copy of this page for your records. If you do not agree, you may stop
the survey now.

o I agree
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Q2)
The following questions ask about your experience with extreme events (such as floods,
droughts, storms, fires). Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree (3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

I have noticed
changes in
extreme events
over my
lifetime

o

o

o

o

o

Extreme events
like drought
and wildfire are
more severe
than they once
were

o

o

o

o

o

Extreme events
have occurred
regularly for as
long as I can
remember

o

o

o

o

o

I believe that
extreme events
are linked to a
changing
climate

o

o

o

o

o
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Q3)
Where do you get your information about the impacts of extreme events beyond what you
experience personally? (Select all that apply)

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

Television, radio, newspapers
Social media
Scientific articles/publications
Government websites or publications
Friends and family
Community members
Other (please specify)
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Q4)
The following questions ask about the impacts of extreme events (such as floods,
droughts, storms, fires). Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree (3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

I have been
negatively
impacted by
extreme events

o

o

o

o

o

I have
experienced
extreme events,
but I have not
been negatively
impacted

o

o

o

o

o

Extreme events
have not
impacted my
livelihood or
sources of
income

o

o

o

o

o

I have
experienced grief
or hopelessness
as a result of
extreme events

o

o

o

o

o

Because extreme
events are
occurring more
often, impacts to
me and/or my
livelihood are
greater than they
once were

o

o

o

o

o
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Q5)
If you indicated above that you have (or may have) been negatively impacted by an
extreme event (by marking 3, 4, or 5 in the first row of Q4), please indicate the types
of impacts you have experienced. (Check all that apply)

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

Loss of physical assets (including property, crops, livestock, etc.)
Physical injury or illness
Lost income
Death of friends or family
Decreased mental health
Displaced from residence (i.e., had to move)
Loss of networks (i.e., removed from friends, family)
Sense of loss or grief over environmental damage or destruction
Other (please specify)
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Q6)
Below is a list of common things that people care deeply about. Because the sliders are
only used in the electronic version of this survey, please write the number which
indicates each item’s importance to you at the end of each itemized line, with 5 =
"very important" and 0 = "not important."
0 = not
important
0
Livelihood / occupation
Income
Community
Family
Mental health
Local landscape and environment
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1

5 = very
important
2

3

4

5

Q7)
Think about what you indicated as important to you in the previous question above.
Consider these things as "what you value." Please indicate how strongly you agree or
disagree with the following statements about what you value.
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree (3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

I believe
extreme events
will negatively
impact what I
value in the
near future

o

o

o

o

o

Extreme
events have
negatively
impacted what
I value in the
recent past

o

o

o

o

o

Climate
change will
negatively
impact what I
value

o

o

o

o

o

I believe
extreme events
will negatively
impact what I
value for the
rest of my
lifetime

o

o

o

o

o

Q8)
What is your job or livelihood? In other words, how do you describe what you do for
work, for example, farmer, rancher, mechanic, teacher, etc.?
________________________________________________________________

108

Q9)
Have you experienced impacts on your job or livelihood due to changes in the climate?

o Yes
o No
o Unsure
Q10)
If you marked “Yes” to Q9 above, please explain these impacts to your job or
livelihood (e.g., lost work hours/days, no or little labor available, decreasing interest from
young people in the profession, etc.).
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Q10 a)
If you marked “Unsure” to Q9 above, please briefly explain why you are unsure if you
have experienced impacts on your job or livelihood due to changes in the climate.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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Q11)
The following question asks about potential impacts to your ability to make a living
under various climate conditions. Please indicate the level of impact each climate
condition could have or has had on your ability to make a living.

Extremely
negative
impact (1)

Somewhat
negative
impact (2)

No impact
(3)

Somewhat
positive
impact (4)

Extremely
positive
impact (5)

Above average
annual
precipitation

o

o

o

o

o

Below average
annual
precipitation

o

o

o

o

o

Above average
annual
temperatures

o

o

o

o

o

Below average
annual
temperatures

o

o

o

o

o
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Q12)
The following questions ask about the impact of extreme events on your job or
livelihood. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree (3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

If a drought like the
2021 drought
happened every
five years, I would
change my job or
livelihood

o

o

o

o

o

If a drought like the
2021 drought
happened every
year, I would
change my job or
livelihood

o

o

o

o

o

Past extreme events
have influenced my
decision(s) to
change my job or
livelihood

o

o

o

o

o

Past extreme events
have influenced my
decision(s) to
relocate

o

o

o

o

o

It would be difficult
for me to change
my job or
livelihood

o

o

o

o

o
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Q13)
The following questions ask about how the impacts of extreme events are distributed
across society. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree
(3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

I feel that I have
been negatively
affected by
extreme events
more so than
others

o

o

o

o

o

Generally, I think
certain people
have been more
affected by
extreme events
than others

o

o

o

o

o

The effects of
extreme events I
have experienced
are commonly
experienced by
others in my
profession

o

o

o

o

o

I have access to
support,
resources, and
information to
help me cope
with the impacts
from extreme
events

o

o

o

o

o
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Q14)
Only three more sets of questions like this. Thank you for sticking with us!
The following questions ask about the impacts of COVID-19 on you and your
community. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree
(3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

Generally, I
think that
COVID-19 has
made my
community
stronger and
more prepared
for the impacts
of extreme
events

o

o

o

o

o

I believe I am
more vulnerable
to the impacts of
extreme events
because of
COVID-19

o

o

o

o

o

Myself and/or
my household
has been worse
off, generally,
since the onset
of COVID-19

o

o

o

o

o
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Q15)
The following questions ask about your perceptions of extreme events and how they
may affect you and others in the future. Please indicate how strongly you agree or
disagree with the following statements.
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree (2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree
(3)

Somewhat
agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

I feel hopeful
about the future,
even if extreme
events such as
drought or
wildfires continue
to affect my region

o

o

o

o

o

I am not confident
in my ability to
cope with the
impacts of extreme
events going
forward

o

o

o

o

o

I am worried about
the ability of
others in my
community to cope
with the impacts of
extreme events in
the future

o

o

o

o

o

I feel helpless and
unable to control
my responses to
extreme events

o

o

o

o

o

I feel connected to
people,
organizations,
businesses, and/or
public decision
makers who can
help me prepare
for and cope with
extreme events

o

o

o

o

o
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Q16)
Which of the following factors have decreased or could decrease your ability to cope
with the impacts of extreme events? (Check all that apply)

▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢
▢

Market price of crops, livestock, and/or feed
State and/or federal policies
Demographic and property ownership change around me
Land prices
Increase in operational costs
Changes in local values
Political turmoil and/or instability
Crop choice
Labor availability and/or cost
Other (please specify)
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Q17) This is the last set of questions like this. Thank you for sticking with us!
The following questions ask about your perceptions of responsibility for responding to
extreme events. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Somewhat
disagree
(2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree
(3)

Somewh
at agree
(4)

Strongly
agree (5)

The Federal government
should bear primary
responsibility for
responding to negative
impacts of extreme
events

o

o

o

o

o

State government should
bear primary
responsibility for
responding to negative
impacts of extreme
events

o

o

o

o

o

Individuals or families
should NOT bear
primary responsibility for
responding to negative
impacts of extreme
events

o

o

o

o

o

Responsibility for
responding to the
impacts of extreme
events should depend on
if the extreme events are
linked to a changing
climate

o

o

o

o

o

I have personally taken
action to prepare for
and/or adapt to extreme
events

o

o

o

o

o

I am part of a group
taking action to prepare
for and/or adapt to
extreme events

o

o

o

o

o
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Q18)
If you indicated above that you have either personally taken action or are part of a
group taking action to prepare for and/or adapt to extreme events (by marking 4 or 5 in
the last two rows of Q17), please briefly describe the actions you and/or your group
have taken.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

We will now ask you a few basic demographic questions before concluding the survey.
Q20)
What year were you born?
________________________________________________________________

Q21)
Roughly how many years have you worked in your current agricultural operation?
________________________________________________________________

Q22)
In what county or counties is your agricultural operation located?
________________________________________________________________
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Q23)
Which of the following best describes your gender?

o Female
o Male
o Non-binary
o Other
Q24)
What is the highest level of education you have completed?

o Grade School
o High School / GED
o Some College or Vocational Training
o 2-Year College
o 4-Year College
o Postgraduate
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Q25)
Which of the following best describes your racial identity?

o White / Caucasian
o Black or African American
o Hispanic, Latino or Spanish
o American Indian or Alaska Native
o Asian
o Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
o Other (please specify)
Q26)
Roughly what percentage of your household income comes from agriculture?

o 0-19%
o 20-39%
o 40-59%
o 60-79%
o 80-100%
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Q27)
What is your estimated gross annual household income before taxes?

o < $50,000
o $50,000-$100,000
o $100,000-$250,000
o $250,000-$400,000
o > $400,000
Q28)
How did you find the link to this survey?

o It was sent to me directly by my local conservation district
o It was provided in a conservation district newsletter
o It was posted to a conservation district website or social media page
o I received an email from someone other than conservation district staff
o A friend or colleague sent it to me
o Other (please specify)
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey! Please use the pre-addressed
envelope enclosed to return it to the research team.
If you are willing to be interviewed by a member of the research team about your
experiences farming and/or ranching in Montana, please provide your contact
information below:
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
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